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ABSTRACT 
This research applies complexity and system dynamics theory to the idea of border 
security, culminating in the development of a conceptual model that can be used to 
expand exploration of unconventional leverage points, better understand holistic 
implications of border policies, and improve sense making for homeland security. How 
can border security be characterized to better understand what it is, and why are so many 
divergent opinions being voiced on whether it can be achieved? By demonstrating the 
border as a complex adaptive system (CAS) through the use of graphic system dynamics 
models, exploring by way of example the influences surrounding the movement of trade 
and transnational terrorists across borders, four policy-centric pillars became evident:  
1) institutional capacity, 2) criminal capacity, 3) ability to move people and goods across 
borders rapidly, and 4) operational capacity. Culture, identity, adversarial adaptation, 
enforcement, and moral values influence and are influenced by, perceptions of what are 
seen as threats. This research illustrates the value of thinking in systems (instead of 
missions or programs), challenges assumptions of what borders and border security are 
thought to be, and intends to inspire creativity in thinking about 21st century borders: 
what they represent and the challenges they pose. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A complex adaptive system (CAS) is a group of simple parts, items, and/or people that 
interact and collectively influence the behavior of a larger system. A CAS is irreducible 
to its parts, and the properties of the parts themselves cannot be combined to describe the 
whole. The key to understanding a CAS is recognizing and analyzing systemic behavioral 
patterns, which can then lend insight as to the interactions and behaviors between the 
parts of the system. Borders are such a system. They are more than a line separating 
countries. They serve as areas, regions, corridors, frontiers, and political and cultural 
interfaces. They are also economic hubs, influence foreign relations, reflect values (and 
fears), and can be used to start wars. These dynamics and relationships create the 
complexity that is the border CAS.  
Border security programs reflect what are currently perceived as threats: people, 
activities, and things that may cause unmanageable national effects. The assumption is 
that the effects of these threats would be irreparable to the “American way of life,” and 
thus, requires a protectionist, zero-sum control strategy. Yet, borders are interdependent 
and evolve with globalization, social and cultural migration, and technological growth. 
The border system cannot be secured, nor can threats be predicted. There is a disconnect 
between threat perception, protectionism, and the characteristics of the border CAS that 
illustrate a gap in knowledge that this thesis contributes towards bridging. Borders are 
cross-matrixed with many divergent people, activities, and things, both licit and illicit, 
and yet, the “American way of life” still stands. Given that threats are fear-based, border 
security programs reflect the fears and uncertainty of policy makers.  
Single-issue border policies, such as the southern border fence and immigration 
reform, do not reflect coherence of system dynamics, are ill suited for the globalized 21st 
century, and create more vulnerabilities, such as the decentralization of criminal 
organizations, increased dangers placed upon migrants, and catalyzing criminal 
organizations to innovate smuggling methods (e.g., catapults, semi-submersibles, 
surgically implanting dogs). Moreover, understanding why the United States (U.S.) 
chooses to see something as a threat requiring both media and executive attention, as well 
 xvii 
as excessive resources and force, is a key factor in understanding the border CAS. 
Agencies, adversaries, elected officials, nongovernmental organizations, and activists 
alike are part of the CAS, and thus, create dynamics through their behaviors. Critically 
self-assessing social, political, economic, cultural, and psychological influences, and 
motivations driving threat perception, are just as important to making sense of “why it is 
the way it is,” as studying criminal behavior.  
Globalization in its current form has blurred the efficacy and coherence of geo-
political borders. The borders, from an institutional perspective, have become an all but 
declared proxy war zone that must be defended at any cost, from value-based, esoteric 
threats (i.e., a threat to a way of life). Yet, as evidenced by trade and economic policies, 
this defense becomes a hindrance to production and goods and services exchanges. The 
protectionist vision has created a border security industry grounded on force, 
surveillance, suspicion, and restriction. Simultaneously, economic and foreign 
interdependencies bolstering globalization require borders to be fluid, and policies 
associated with them facilitatory. As nations continue to expand economic and 
resource interdependencies in the name of growth, the systems of social welfare, 
identity, employment, criminal enterprise, and corporate interest also become 
interdependent and evolve. 
Through modeling of ‘transnational terrorist’ and ‘trade’ cross-border movement, 
four policy-centric, external pillars that affect border security became evident: 1) 
institutional capacity and priorities, 2) criminal capacity and priorities, 3) the ability to 
move people and goods across borders rapidly, and 4) operational capacity and priorities. 
Culture, identity, adversarial adaptation, enforcement, and moral values influence and are 
influenced by, subjective perceptions of what is seen to be a threat. The border has been 
found to be a frontier landscape of globalization. It is a merger of “us” and “them:” 
domestic and foreign, rich and poor, secular and religious, individual and collective, 
social and political, moral and amoral. The border and border security serve as an 
intersection of interdependent, interconnected agents that respond, experience, learn, and 
adapt.  
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IMPLICATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
By recognizing the interconnectedness of institutional, operational, facilitation, 
and criminal capabilities, both foreign and domestic, leaders and policy makers can begin 
to understand the global implications of border characteristics, and security measures 
thereof. Prior to this research, it was not readily understood the degree to which 
seemingly unrelated phenomena, such as perceptions of identity or foreign economic 
policies, create fluctuations in border behaviors. The researcher believed economic 
interdependencies existed, but was surprised to discover the depth and breadth of social 
and cultural influences well beyond border regions. This discovery has the potential of 
completely reframing the function and reach of border security.  
Through the study of borders CAS characteristics, a contribution has been made 
to furthering the fields of border security, national security, and social and foreign policy 
by providing additional insights into the nature of 21st century borders. Modeling the 
border CAS provides policy makers the opportunity to consider a new method of sensing 
situational awareness, a technique to draw associations between policy, perceptions, and 
behaviors, and a new perspective on what security programs are apt to achieve.  
This thesis contributes to bridging a knowledge gap that exists in understanding 
the complexity of border security, dynamics that result in unintended consequences from 
and to foreign and domestic policies, and why measures of border security are so elusive. 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to bridging the knowledge gap in making sense of 
how many divergent fields, such as psychology, defense, control, economy, globalization, 
and jurisdictional authority, connect and relate to one another in context of borders. This 
research can be used to expand the exploration of unconventional leverage points, better 
understand holistic implications of border policies, explore the institutionalization of 
systems thinking, and more broadly, improve sense making for homeland security.  
As the border security complex continues to struggle with bridging ‘security’ with 
“facilitation and growth,” social groups throughout the world in turn struggle with the 
effects these issues place upon their safety and identity. The conceptual model of the 
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border CAS is one step towards understanding the consequences of these struggles, and 
towards better informing policy decisions.  
CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrated that border security is a CAS. It demonstrated that the 
border is a living system, interconnected, interdependent, learning, and evolving along 
with other global systems. The border CAS influences and is affected by social and 
cultural identities, and technological advancements, which are important because CAS 
behaviors cannot be predicted, nor can they be controlled in an open society. This 
research is intended to provide a foundation from which coherence of borders and border 
security can be built; the conceptual model will not in itself achieve this end. The 
research focuses on historical context, perceptions, identity, and the subjectivity of threat. 
It does not describe all issues that affect border security, nor does it attempt to examine 
the logistical, legislative, jurisdictional, or legal constraints associated with border 
policies. Moreover, the conceptual model developed from this research is one-
dimensional and does not visually present the multi-layered, multi-dimensional 
ecosystem that borders and border security create. Finally, this thesis does not provide a 
prescriptive solution to border security, quantitative evidence, or regional variances of 
border dynamics.  
Leaders must begin to ask, “security for whom exactly, and for which moral value 
specifically?”1 By exploring how differing social, political, cultural, and moral influences 
affect crime rates at borders, leverage points will begin to emerge. Insights will be 
elucidated as to how policies affect disparate sub-systems, systems, and systems-of-
systems. The ecosystems of trade, radicalization, foreign policy, identities, and 
technology will be understood to create many highly complex adaptive systems, 
interconnected and constantly evolving. This thesis was one small step towards that end. 
1 Attributed to analysis provided by David A. Baldwin in “The Concept of Security,” Review of 
International Studies no. 23 (1997): 5–26. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a myth that drives many change initiatives into the ground: that 
the organization needs to change because it is broken. The reality is that 
any social system (including an organization or a country or a family) is 
the way it is because the people in that system (at least those individuals 
and factions with the most leverage) want it that way.1 
A. THE PROBLEM 
This research applies complexity and system dynamics theory to the concept of 
United States border security to develop a conceptual model that can be used to expand 
exploration of unconventional leverage points for border security, better understand 
holistic implications of border policies, and improve sense making for homeland security.  
What is border security? How and against what benchmarks is achievement of 
border security measured? What constitutes a measure of effectiveness for protection? 
These are all questions presented to representatives of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) by Congress, the administration, and more frequently, the public. While 
it is not the goal of this thesis to answer these questions, this work will illustrate whether 
a conceptual complex adaptive system (CAS) model would help to do so, and improve 
understanding as to why the border environment ‘is the way it is’, while also alighting 
potential leverage points for systemic improvements. Developing a conceptual model of 
the complexity of border security to illustrate the value of thinking in systems (instead of 
missions or programs) is a second objective of this thesis. Lastly, this thesis intends to 
challenge assumptions of what borders and border security are thought to be, catalyze 
discussions about the interconnections of identity and globalization, and to inspire 
creativity in thinking about 21st century borders: what they represent and the challenges 
they pose.  
1 Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools 
and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World (Watertown, MA: Harvard Business Press, 
2009), 17. 
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Five key attributes are used to describe a CAS:2 1) continuous adaptation of 
assumptions, expectations, values, and habits by interactive agents (i.e., schemata), 2) 
continuous adaptation of larger enterprise patterns of interaction, 3) agents individually 
striving for equilibrium, while also adapting to other agents’ behaviors—creating 
numerous variations of behavior, 4) continuous learning patterns, or “feedback loops” 
between agents (which produce the co-evolution noted in attributes 1–3), and 5) 
adaptability of the agents and system rendering them free from authoritative control. This 
definition will first be used to argue that border security is indeed a CAS. Next, this 
definition will again be used so that these attributes can be identified, described, and 
mapped within a conceptual model of border security, to represent the CAS visually.  
Institutionalizing system and complexity thinking is a necessary first step towards 
understanding and navigating complex adaptive systems. Systems thinking is critical to 
comprehending the dynamics of interdependencies, relationships, and identification of 
effective performance measures. Immigration, trade, crime, terrorism, and enforcement 
are behaviors created and reinforced by system dynamics. What environmental factors 
(natural, political, social, structural, economic, moral) influence these behaviors to occur? 
What creates the increases and decreases in these behaviors? What, where, when, and 
how do social, economic, cultural, religious, and political factors affect these behaviors? 
How do these behaviors change over time and space? These questions reflect systems 
thinking. The answers to these questions are used to develop patterns. Understanding 
these patterns is sense making.  
This research demonstrates that the border is a CAS, exploring by way of 
example, the influences surrounding the movement of trade and transnational terrorists 
across borders. Fluctuations within the border system are shown not to come from 
mechanistic processes (e.g., automating manifests, machine readable passports, enhanced 
drivers licenses, portal monitors), but from learned human behaviors and individual 
2 James E. Prewitt, Dick Weil, and Anthony Q. McClure, “A Complex Adaptive Systems Approach to 
Strategic Planning,” Asian Journal of Business and Management Sciences 1, no. 11 (2012): 97–98, 
http://www.ajbms.org/articlepdf/ajbms201211i11111.pdf. 
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responses to what are seen as threats, such as identity, perceived fairness of policies, 
quality of information, desired security levels, and acceptable cost.  
B.  THE NEED 
As technology and threats rapidly adapt in a changing and budget-constrained 
environment, the homeland security project must also adapt its missions, strategies, and 
performance to seek balance between optimization (limiting redundancies), efficiency 
(speed), and effectiveness (achieve intended objective). The complexity of social system 
dynamics limit predictive capabilities, and render traditional performance measures 
useless. The number of people interdicted at or between ports of entry, for example, does 
not inform decision makers as to the security of the border. Similarly, the kilograms or 
pounds of drugs seized do not inform the state of the drug trade.  
Borders are interdependent and evolve with globalization, social and cultural 
migration, and technological growth. Understanding the current state of border regions, 
lines, corridors, frontiers, and social and cultural exchanges, is necessary to improve 
decision-making. Single-issue border policies, such as the southern border fence and 
immigration reform, are ill suited for the 21st century, and create more asymmetrical 
threats, such as decentralization of criminal organizations, increased dangers placed upon 
migrants, and catalyzing criminal organizations to innovate smuggling methods (e.g., 
catapults, semi-submersibles, surgically implanting dogs).  
A model is needed that captures both the complexities and inherent dynamic 
attributes of the border security enterprise if any meaningful analysis of the system is 
desired. Further, such a conceptual model would enable development of computational 
models and the testing of multiple policy, strategy, and tactical alternatives through 
simulation. Simulations would save money, aid decision makers in identifying key 
leverage points within the system, and mitigate unintended consequences that result from 
an incomplete understanding of the border security enterprise. A coherent and usable, 
conceptual model is the first requisite step.  
 3 
C.  THE QUESTION 
How can border security be characterized to understand better what it is, and why 
so many divergent opinions exist as to whether it can be achieved? Would the historical 
context of U.S. borders help to understand better what form and function border security 
serves today? Do social, cultural, economic, or identity factors affect how threats are 
perceived, and by extension, border vulnerabilities?  
D.  THE SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis contributes to bridging a knowledge gap that exists in understanding 
the complexity of border security, dynamics that result in unintended consequences from 
the implementation of foreign policies, and why measures of border security are so 
elusive. The results of the research are used to construct a conceptual (i.e., theoretical) 
model that can be used to further study, and eventually, test variables of border dynamics 
and alternative policy options.  
E.  LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND MODEL 
This research explores whether border security is a living system. In other words, 
whether characteristics of complex adaptive systems are present, and if so, whether this 
finding contributes to better understanding the challenges 21st century borders pose to the 
concept of measuring effectiveness of border policies, identifying unconventional 
leverage points for border security, and more broadly, improving sensemaking for 
homeland security. This research is intended to provide a foundation from which 
coherence of borders and border security can be built; the conceptual model will not in 
itself achieve this end. The research focuses on historical context, perceptions, identity, 
and subjective threat. It does not describe all issues that affect border security, nor does it 
attempt to examine the logistical, legislative, jurisdictional, or legal constraints associated 
with border policies. Moreover, the conceptual model developed from this research is 
one-dimensional, and does not visually present the multi-layered, multi-dimensional 
ecosystem that borders and border security create. Finally, this thesis does not provide a 
prescriptive solution to border security, quantitative evidence, or regional variances of 
border dynamics.  
 4 
F.  METHOD 
A graphic model was chosen to illustrate visually the complexity of border 
security. System dynamics was chosen as the archetype for the conceptual model to 
convince the reader, through visual illustration, that border security is not a linear, 
geographic, or static process, but rather, a complex adaptive system with dynamic 
behavioral attributes that respond and evolve (both positively and negatively) to policy 
implementations.  
Modeling the entire domain of border security manually in a single model is 
untenable, so the researcher identified two issues within the system (trade and terrorist 
movement), and built several smaller models with fewer variables to demonstrate specific 
phenomena. While these models were not built using software tools (which would 
convert them from conceptual to computational), techniques were used that may aid in 
making this conversion.  
Relationships between actors and elements are explained at the macro-level, and 
how they exist present day. Details associated with process workflows are not within the 
scope of this model. Components, relationships, elements, and influences were selected 
for incorporation if they were found to have a geographical, functional, social, strategic, 
financial, technological, or have oversight nexus to borders.  
G.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
1.  Chapter II—Literature Review. This thesis continues with a literature 
review of complex adaptive system, border security, and usefulness of system dynamics 
modeling. The purpose of the literature review is to frame the definitions and 
characteristics associated with these concepts. This framing provides the foundational 
underpinnings from which the researcher identifies, conceptualizes, and in turn, models 
the border security system. 
2.  Chapter III—A Brief History of U.S. Borders. This chapter explores a 
historical review of U.S. borders, and what purpose they were seen to serve. This chapter 
is not intended to be a comprehensive historical record, nor is it a thorough accounting of 
all nuances related to historical events. The objective of this chapter is to provide the 
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reader with a historical perspective of how and why competing perceptions and goals of 
the U.S. border exist present day. Understanding the history will elucidate why confusion 
is growing as to what border security is (or should be). 
Borders can be at once, a line, region, corridor, community, a reflection of values, 
and a node. One constant throughout border dialogue, however, is the view of a 
separation between “us” and “them;” an intersection between cultures, political control, 
resource ownership, control of transit from one point to another, and a division between 
national identities. It would, therefore, prove helpful to become familiar with how U.S. 
borders have evolved to present day, to better understand border security as a CAS.  
3.  Chapter IV—Perception of Threats. Chapter IV explores some open 
source concepts of threats to discuss briefly some contradictions in the understanding of 
what constitutes a threat and limitations to the coherence of border security that these 
issues create. The objective of this exploration is simply to call into question the common 
assumptions of what a threat is understood to be.  
4.  Chapter V—Modeling Complexity. This chapter explores some of the 
direct and indirect influences, information flows, and rate controls that affect the behavior 
of the border system, such as trade agreements, radicalization, perceived identity loss, 
acceptable costs, institutional, capabilities, and desired levels of security. Two border 
issues are presented, (1) transnational terrorists, and (2) trade. These two issues were 
chosen based upon their many intersections with the existential ideologies of an 
American way of life, regional, national and global economic dependencies, the 
intersection of defense and protection, and the frequently cited importance of these issues 
in homeland security budget justifications. An attempt is made in this chapter to 
demonstrate that border security is a concept that is reinforced through subjectively 
perceived threats rooted in the influence of foreign, social, and economic value systems, 
non-linear and non-enforceable. The effects of these influences upon people create the 
dynamics that frame the border as a CAS, catalyze adaptive behaviors, and demonstrate 
the need to re-think the form and function of border security. Stock and flow diagrams 
are the modeling technique used to present the basic elements, activity flows, rate 
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controls, and a sampling of feedback loops influencing movement around and through 
borders.  
The chapter ends by presenting the holistic conceptual model associated with the 
institutional, operational, facilitation, and criminal pillars, and a sampling of influences 
that interconnect them. This conceptual model provides a visual representation of the 
interconnected influences that holistically contribute to the behavior of the border CAS. 
The objective of this model is to contribute to a better understanding of why single-issue 
policies, such as deploying technologies along the border, will not lead to secure borders, 
and may in fact, create more vulnerabilities.  
5. Chapter VI—Conclusion. This chapter re-states the problem, research 
question, and challenges posed by 21st century borders that necessitate understanding the 
border as a CAS. The research findings are summarized to describe how the conceptual 
CAS model can further efforts to understand better what border security is. The value of 
why thinking in systems (relationships and feedback instead of missions and programs) is 
necessary to bridge the gap in border coherence is also explained. The chapter ends with 
future research recommendations to further modeling efforts. 
6. Chapter VII—Post Conclusion: Moving Forward. Chapter VII provides 
the reader with practical recommendations to develop, verify, and validate the CAS 
model through testing and simulation. This chapter is intended to provide considerations 
on how the conceptual model presented herein can be transformed from theory to 
usability. The chapter concludes with suggested steps towards institutionalization of 
systems thinking, government wide, which will enable the wider application of the 
analytic and modeling techniques demonstrated throughout this thesis to other homeland 
security topics.  
 7 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When border policies are implemented, can anyone predict what will occur 
throughout industries, communities, and societies that interface with the border: systems 
such as financial and consumer markets, manufacturing, foreign relations, criminal 
organizations, and cultural identities? Is it these interfaces that characterize a complex 
adaptive system (CAS)? The objective of this literature review is to explore published 
information, to assess what is known and accepted about CAS, borders and border 
security, and where disagreements and gaps exist. This review is separated into three 
sections: 1) characteristics of CAS, 2) border security, and 3) the value of system 
dynamics modeling.  
The Level 1 alert order, an order one step below a complete closure of the U.S. 
border, was issued to all air, land, and sea ports of entry by 11:00 a.m. on September 11, 
2001. The U.S. Customs Service (Department of Treasury) and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (Department of Justice) commenced executing the order through 
full examination and inspection of all cargo, vehicles, and people approaching the 
border.3 Hours later, all air borders were completely closed, re-opening on a limited basis 
three days later.4 Within just a few days of implementation, the effects of this border 
policy became evident on a global scale; border security is interconnected with 
international and domestic economic, political, social, and diplomatic systems.  
Queue wait times to cross the border increased, from minutes to hours. Local 
police and fire departments on both sides of the border managed the consequences of 
traffic jams, abandoned vehicles, and overheating live animal cargo. The Red Cross and 
Salvation Army deployed to aid stranded drivers with no food, water, or toilets.5 
Computer manufacturers in Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea could not ship their 
3 Edward Alden, The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 
9/11 (New York: Harpers Collins Publishers, 2008), 42.  
4 Ibid., 47–40; % U.S. trade by value (air freight); ½ of that value transiting via dedicated air cargo 
planes. 
5 Ibid., 43; Ambassador Bridge, 12–18 hour delays, City of Windsor, Red Cross and Salvation Army-
food/water, Ontario provincial police-toilets, fire departments-cooling live cattle shipments.  
 9 
                                                 
products, which consequentially left domestic distributors short stocked. Mexican 
agricultural and manufacturing industries issued forced layoffs due to significant 
shipment delays. Governors from states along the northern U.S. border with Canada, 
facing severe local economic losses, began petitioning the President to deploy increased 
numbers of National Guard units to help speed up border inspections. Washington State, 
for example, experienced a 50% drop in tourism and lost over $100 million in local 
revenue because of the security posture.6 The auto industry, with their just-in-time 
production methodology, had to shutdown manufacturing due to parts shortages resulting 
in a 15% market share loss, and Canadian suppliers losing the approximate value of  
$1–1.5 million/hour.7 Ford, for example, had to close five assembly plants throughout the 
United States, General Motors had to reduce or cancel work shifts at four U.S. plants, and 
Chrysler had to re-structure its supply chain cross-border logistics from commercial 
trucking to rail to keep production lines active. Civilians in Kentucky, Washington, 
Michigan, Tennessee, Canada, and Mexico lost wages and/or jobs. In one week, security 
measures at the U.S. border created supply chain shortages that reverberated around the 
world. 
Border policies, behaviors, and relationships create global and domestic 
implications. The economic effects experienced from the Level 1 policy described above, 
opened a much larger debate that continues to this day. The debate centers on 
determining what border security actually means, whether it can be achieved, and if so, 
how it should be measured. This center, in turn, pivots around balancing often-conflicting 
objectives of “facilitation” (i.e., rapid crossing) and “security” (i.e., protection).  
The breadth and depth of the global and domestic implications of border security 
are still not well understood, nor are all the intersections and leverage points known from 
which to mitigate adverse effects of security policies. Additionally, literature does not 
demonstrate any consistency as to what a border or border security means, by which to 
base analysis to determine implications and leverage points. For example, in one 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Jennifer Lake describes four functional 
6 Alden, The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11, 4. 
7 Ibid., 45. 
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areas as “border security:” (1) immigration, (2) cargo, (3) transportation, and (4) 
maritime.8 In a different report, Marc Rosenblum references threats, such as illegal 
migration, communicable diseases, criminal networks, potential terrorists, and goals, such 
as facilitation of trade and travel, as border security.9 What is security? What constitutes 
a threat to whatever security is? Are the threats Rosenblum refers to, threats to border 
security, or are they the visible manifestations of deeper and broader social, economic, 
political, and identity hazards? Would it not be reasonable to consider these deeper, 
broader hazards as the true threats to border security, as opposed to their manifestations?  
How can a territorial boundary, a geographically defined concept, influence and 
affect global, local, and corporate economies and values? Rather than function, 
capability, threat, or geographic descriptors, could the border be viewed from a living 
systems perspective? This view would presuppose the border as a living part of a 
community, which in turn, is a living part of a nation or world ecosystem. What messages 
does the border send to the ecosystem, and vice versa? What pathways are used to 
communicate those messages? Is it possible to know when a border is healthy? Staying 
with the living system analogy, what are the viruses and bacteria (i.e., threats) that could 
infect borders? What exactly is a border, given its interfaces with socio-political and 
economic systems? In addition, what do these interfaces mean for homeland security 
policy makers?  
Understanding the characteristics, functions, structures, and boundaries of the 
U.S. border CAS, is a necessary foundation for any border security policy analysis. 
Conceptualizing the border as a CAS is not an easy task. The volume of relationships of 
interwoven processes and policies, authorities and social groups that function within, 
around, and/or through the border increases complexity. Additionally, stakeholders exist 
that have a vested interest in maintaining the traditional view that the border is but just a 
8 Jennifer Lake, Border and Transportation Security: Overview of Congressional Issues, CRS Report 
RL32705 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2004), 2. 
9 Marc C. Rosenblum, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristen M. Finklea, Border Security: Understanding 
Threats at U.S. Borders, CRS Report R42969 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 2013), 4. http://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42969.pdf. 
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checkpoint, others understand the border as something linear and static, to be hardened as 
a defense measure. Others still conceive the border to be a reflection of social values, for 
example, openness, community, acceptance, trust, individuality, suspicion, distrust, or a 
sense of superiority.  
Understanding how and where these influences fit into the holistic view of the 
border is critical to developing effective security policies, as they can impact institutional 
effectiveness, and possibly, result in unintended consequences.  
This literature review identifies the fundamental characteristics of CAS, the 
definition and meaning of contemporary border security, and the value of system 
dynamics modeling. Findings from the research are used to identify and conceptually 
model the U.S. border system with the intention of furthering research towards a better 
understanding of border policy implications.  
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS (CAS) 
A system is defined as a “regularly interacting and interdependent group of parts, 
items, or people that form a unified whole with the purpose of establishing a goal.”10 A 
formally accepted definition is not available in literature for a complex system, but 
Mitchell describes it as “a large network of relatively simple components with no central 
control, in which emergent complex behavior is exhibited.”11 Furthermore, a CAS, yet 
more difficult to define formally, is commonly understood as a system “composed of 
populations of adaptive agents whose interactions result in complex non-linear dynamics, 
the results of which are emergent system phenomena.”12 Plainly stated, a CAS is a group 
of simple parts, items, or people that interact, and collectively influence the behavior of 
the larger system, behavior of which is irreducible to its parts.  
10 Annabel Beerel, Leadership and Change Management (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2009), 35, http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/27451_02_Beerel_Ch_02.pdf. 
11 Melanie Mitchell, Complex Systems: Network Thinking, Working Paper 2006–10–036 (Santa Fe, 
NM: Santa Fe Institute, 2006), 2. 
12 Jason Brownlee, Complex Adaptive Systems, Technical Report 070302A, Complex Intelligent 
Systems Laboratory (Melbourne, AUS: Swinburne University of Technology, 2007), 1. 
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System behavior can be observed holistically, which lends insight as to the 
interactions between the parts, items, or people within the system. Are there specific 
characteristics that create a CAS? Researchers have attempted to identify these 
characteristics since the 1970s, when complexity studies first began. A debate continues 
as to a formalization of known characteristics.  
De Weijer associates dynamic social behaviors as a principle characteristic. Capra 
associates interdependencies. Gell-Mann associates feedback loops, randomness, learned 
behavior (i.e., memory), and evolution.13 Juarrero also associates feedback loops as a 
characteristic of a CAS; however, views this phenomena not of randomness like Gell-
Mann, but from one of interpersonal relationships.14  
Structurally, another divergence in the literature exists regarding building blocks. 
Dodder and Dare associate agents (people, parts, items) at one level of a system as being 
the building blocks for agents at the next level; a hierarchical perspective.15 Capra 
disagrees, and is careful to note that no building blocks exist in systems. Living systems, 
Capra explains, are nodes of networks within networks, at all varying levels of the 
system, which, in turn, interact with other systems. Capra relates a CAS “structure” not to 
that of hierarchy, but to concepts of quantum theory. In other words, at the subatomic 
level no matter exists, just “patterns of probabilities.”16 Juarrero goes further and 
describes that boundaries of a system are just as much a part of the system as the 
relationships (interactions) within the structure. The boundaries of a system can expand 
or contract as a result of the feedback loops associated with interactions between agents, 
and between agents and the system. This expansion and contraction (i.e., evolution) 
13 Murray Gell-Mann, “Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems,” in The Evolution of Human 
Languages. SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings, X: 3–18, ed. J. A. Hawkins and M. 
Gell-Mann (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992), 11, http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~mgm/Site/Publications_ 
files/MGM%20107.pdf. 
14 Alicia Juarrero, “Complex Dynamical Systems Theory,” Cognitive Edge Network, 2010, 3, 
http://cognitive-edge.com/uploads/articles/100608%20Complex_Dynamical_Systems_Theory.pdf. 
15 Rebecca Dodder and Robert Dare, Complex Adaptive Systems and Complexity Theory: Inter-related 
Knowledge Domains (Cambridge: MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000), 2, http://web.mit. 
edu/esd.83/www/notebook/ComplexityKD.PDF. 
16 Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1997), 30. 
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reflects interdependency between the parts of a system and the system as a whole. 
Additionally, Juarrero describes how the system structure itself is formed by the patterns 
of the relationships between agents, and between the agents and the system. Connectivity 
and interaction are the key characteristics of this shaping, and are the basis for 
complexity and self-organization.17  
Although researchers have not yet agreed on all characteristics of a CAS, some 
key similarities do exist. Dodder and Dare, for example, discuss 1) systemic tendencies to 
seek an optimal balance between order and the edge of chaos, 2) networks of agents that 
learn from one another and create the environment of the system by means of their 
interactions (learning theory), and 3) co-evolution of both agents and the system as a 
whole.18 Gell-Mann similarly references learning behavior as a characteristic of CAS. He 
describes how “regularities of experience” are “recorded” and “compressed” by both 
agents and the system, into a model or schemata, which is then shared throughout the 
system via feedback loops. All other more “chance” information is discarded. This 
feature, Gell-Mann explains, is what characterizes a complex system as adaptive.19  
Gell-Mann writes that one of the most important characteristics of a CAS is how 
properties of the parts of the system cannot be combined to describe the whole. Rather, 
that a “crude look at the whole” is a necessary first step, from which simplifications will 
emerge.20 Similarly, Capra writes that properties of the parts of a system cannot bring 
coherence to the larger whole.21  
Brownlee compiled lists of four complexity theorists’ perspectives on 
characteristics of CAS: 1) Murray Gell-Mann, 2) John H. Holland, 3) W. Brian Arthur, 
and 4) Simon A. Levin. Whereas Holland, Arthur, and Levin describe principles and 
17 Juarrero, “Complex Dynamical Systems Theory,” 2. 
18 Dodder and Dare, Complex Adaptive Systems and Complexity Theory: Inter-related Knowledge 
Domains, 6. 
19 Gell-Mann, “Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems,” 10–11.  
20 Ibid., 14. 
21 Capra, The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems, 29. 
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properties as characteristics, Gell-Mann describes cyclic behavioral elements and system 
lifecycle issues. These perspectives are summarized in a table presented in Appendix A.  
B. BORDER SECURITY 
Nation-states are separated by geographical boundaries, and presuppose separate 
and distinct institutions. Yet, growing debate is occurring as to whether the meaning of 
borders is shifting, and whether nation-states are still functionally separate from one 
another. Borders are most commonly understood to represent the “territorial exclusivity 
of the nation-state…mak[ing] of the border a line that divides the national and the global 
into two mutually exclusive domains.”22 A formalized definition of security does not 
exist, but it can generally be understood as the process of identifying threats, and taking 
measures to protect against them. Furthermore, border security is difficult to define, but 
can be thought of as control of territorial boundaries.23 Simply put, border security is 
currently understood as the process by which the separation between nation-states is 
protected against external (read, distinctly foreign) threats.  
By its very nature, globalization discards “mutual exclusivity.” Trade and 
international bordering are just two examples of the effect of globalization, where pre-
clearance inspection or certification sites for one country are located well inside that of 
another, away from geographical borders.24 If protection of the separation between 
nation-states represents border security, and by extension protection of sovereignty, how 
does globalization fit into the picture, where global interests are shared, interconnected, 
and borderless? How is the view of security shifting, if at all, as result of globalization? Is 
the concept of border security changing?  
22 Saskia Sassen, “When National Territory is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings,” 
New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (December 2005): 523, http://www.saskiasassen.com/PDFs/publications/ 
When-National-Territory-is-Home-to-the-Global.pdf. 
23 In a December 2012 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) explained, from 
fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2011, border security was defined by the border patrol as “operational 
control” (interchangeably referred to as “effective control”). This meant the number of miles that the border 
patrol was able to detect, respond, and interdict “illegal activity.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and 
Resource Needs, (2012), 10–11. 
24 Sassen, “When National Territory is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings,” 530. 
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Huysmans argues that the concept of security is expanding to include economic, 
societal, political, and environmental threats, which implies the linking of survival of the 
individual, ecological, community and more.25 He describes the identification of threats 
as being driven by a “double fear,” that is, fear of death and fear of uncertainty. It is this 
“double fear” and the absence of reason it creates, Huysmans says, that leads to the 
objectifying of death as a concrete danger, such as criminals and evils, and the entry of 
mediating agencies, such as political communities and churches.26 Whereas Huysmans 
describes security in the context of fear, death, and threat, Rothschild analyzes the 
concept from a principle-based view. She argues that four purposes exist for using 
principles to define or describe security that commonly frame the subject: 1) theoretical 
derivations are important organization of policy, 2) principles guide public opinion and 
the way they think about security, 3) a mechanism by which to contest existing policies, 
and 4) a mechanism by which to influence distribution of money and power.27 
Furthermore, Rothschild refers to “extended security,” from which four (4) principle-
bounded forms have emerged: 1) security extended from nations to groups and 
individuals, 2) security extended from nations to the international, supranational systems, 
3) extension of the types of security (e.g., from military to political, economic, social, 
environmental), and 4) extension of responsibility for security in all directions (e.g., from 
nation-state to international institutions, to local government; to nongovernmental 
organizations, to public opinion and media, to forces of nature and market).28 Although 
Huysmans and Rothschild diverge on the foundation of the concept of security (fear and 
principle, respectively), they do appear to agree that the nature of security has evolved 
and is becoming highly interconnected and interdependent with social, economic, 
political, and environmental systems.  
25 Jef Huysmans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” European 
Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (June 1998): 227.  
26 Ibid., 235, 238. 
27 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?” Daedalus 124, no. 3, The Quest for World Order (Summer 
1995): 59, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2002731.  
28 Ibid., 55. 
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Jurisdictionally, Sassen claims that globalization “is producing ruptures in the 
mosaic of border regimes underlying the international system of exclusive territorial 
demarcations.”29 Stated another way, the meaning of national boundaries is being 
questioned due to changes in territorial authorities and rights. Whereas borders have 
historically represented state jurisdiction and institutional control, new forms of borders 
are emerging, over which supranational authorities, such as foreign investment and the 
reach of international agreements, have jurisdiction and control inside of another nation-
state. Spolaore discusses how expansion of borders may lead to political costs, due to 
diversification of communities and desired services of government. Spolaore continues to 
state that with this diversification (heterogeneity), comes disparate “cultures, values, 
norms, habits, languages, religions, ethnicities” and disagreements “over the fundamental 
characteristics of the state.”30 Whereas Sassen associates globalization with shifts in 
nation-state authorities, Spolaore associates social and cultural elements that create 
evolution in the value of states. These divergent perspectives have key similarities that 
can tangibly affect changes in the meaning and context of border security practices and 
policies, the CAS characteristics of evolution and adaption of the values and authorities 
of the nation-state.  
Economically, Walkenhorts and Dihel associate increased border control 
measures with increased transport, handling, insurance, and customs costs (referred to as 
“frictional trading costs”), which makes “international trade more expensive and tend to 
reduce imports and exports.”31 Burt does not entirely agree. He claims “little evidence 
that tighter security measures have materially affected trade volumes” exists.32 Whereas 
Burt analyzed the trade volume of Canada, Walkenhorst and Dihel analyzed global 
impacts beyond North America. This variance in analytic approach suggests increased 
29 Sassen, “When National Territory is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings,” 523. 
30 Enrico Spolaore, “National Borders, Conflict and Peace,” in Oxford Handbook of the Economics of 
Peace and Conflict, ed. Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), Chapter 30, 765, http://sites.tufts.edu/enricospolaore/files/2012/08/National-Borders-Conflict-and-
Peace.pdf. 
31 Peter Walkenhorst and Nora Dihel, “Trade Impacts of Increased Border Security Concern,” The 
International Trade Journal 20, no. 1 (2006): 23.  
32 Michael Burt, “Tighter Border Security and Its Effect on Canadian Exports,” Canadian Public 
Policy 35, no. 2 (June 2009): 168.  
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border control measures in North America have differing effects on trade volumes in 
distinct regions of the world, over time, similar to CAS characteristic of the feedback 
loops of interconnections, interdependencies, and evolution of a system as a whole.  
Similar to Huysmans discussion of double fear influencing the objectifying of 
threats, Salter and Mutlu use psychoanalytic theory to describe a unique interpretation of 
the meaning behind post-9/11 border security. Salter and Mutlu associate the trauma of 
9/11 with a form of national post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), from which a 
reshaping of both foreign policy and American identity has emerged in an effort to 
“balance death drives and erotic desires,” which has manifested itself in excessive border 
policies, technologies, and programs.33 They continue to associate two paradoxical 
functions of current border security measures, 1) “fix” insecurity of open borders, and 2) 
construct a version of America that does not need border security.34 The influence of 
trauma on policy decisions and public perception is an example of cross-fertilization and 
influence between agents, similar to the social and systemic changes that occur within a 
CAS, as de Weijer explained, and emergent “order” as described by Dodder and Dare. 
Psychology, defense, control, economy, globalization, and jurisdictional authority 
cannot be combined to describe “border security.” Each are systems in their own right, 
associated with many other systems, such as social identities, business, transportation, 
law enforcement, manufacturing, and employment, to name a few. Each part interacts and 
is interdependent within a larger social and global construct, highlighting how many 
disparate parts critical to the functioning of the whole cannot be combined to describe the 
whole; a key characteristics of a CAS as described by Gell-Mann. Yet, policy makers still 
perceive borders as simply a geographic line requiring protection from “illegal 
crossings,”35 which is evidenced by the current debates in Congress, where measurement 
33 Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, “Psychoanalytic Theory and Border Security,” European Journal 
of Social Theory 15, no. 2 (May 2012): 186, 192.  
34 Ibid., 189. 
35 Laura Meckler, “Defining Border Security Key to Senate Immigration Talks,” The Wall Street 
Journal, Updated February 1, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732392610 
4578278240287317724. 
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of border control is influencing the progress (or not) of domestic policies, such as 
immigration reform.36  
C. THE VALUE OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING 
Beerel finds that system thinking in general is an ability to identify root causes of 
problems, and in turn, more holistically see the world. This sight, or sense, results in 
awareness that solutions for systemic problems are not a quick fix or technical, and 
cannot be addressed in isolation. She further describes system dynamics as “a method for 
looking at the reinforcing and non-reinforcing behaviors that either support or challenge 
attempts to change.”37  
The research showed CAS dynamics exist through borders and border security. 
These are a result of behavioral interactions and interdependencies, and require a holistic 
view before any insights can be drawn as to cause and leverage. Thus, a system dynamics 
modeling technique would best serve to illustrate the behavioral complexity of border 
security.  
D. SUMMARY 
To re-state the findings above, a CAS is a group of simple parts, items, and/or 
people that interact and collectively influence the behavior of the larger system, behavior 
which is irreducible to its parts. Just as a CAS cannot be reduced to its parts, the 
properties of the parts cannot be combined to describe the whole. System behavior can be 
observed holistically, which lends insight as to the interactions and behaviors between the 
parts of the system. Both the parts and the system as a whole are adaptive when they 
record and share information and experience through feedback loops. As evidenced by 
the literature, significant global complexities exist in understanding borders and border 
security. A knowledge gap exists in making sense of how the divergent fields, such as 
psychology, defense, control, economy, globalization, and jurisdictional authority 
36 Stewart Powell, “Changing the Definition of “Border Security” Could Be Key to Immigration 
Overhaul,” Houston Chronicle, February 27, 2013, http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2013/02/changing-
the-definition-of-%E2%80%9Cborder-security%E2%80%9D-could-be-key-to-immigration-overhaul/. 
37 Beerel, Leadership and Change Management, 32–33.  
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connect and relate to one another, at and around the border. Each are systems in their own 
right, and are associated with many other systems, such as social and national identities, 
business, transportation, law enforcement, manufacturing, and employment, to name a 
few. Each part interacts and is interdependent within a larger social and global construct. 
An attempt is made to demonstrate those interconnections visually, via the conceptual 
model that is the product of this thesis. The next chapter briefly explores the history of 
U.S. borders to provide context of how the form and function of borders has evolved 
since 1783.  
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. BORDERS 
The great ideals of national sovereignty, independence, nationality as the 
basis of states, were wonderful achievements in the eighteenth century, in 
a world which was so vast before the industrial revolution had begun. 
…But nothing is eternal in this world, and we are again in the throes of a 
crisis which demands reinterpretation of the foundations of our social 
life.38  
–Emery Reves 
The Oxford Dictionaries defines “border” as “… a line separating two political or 
geographical areas, especially countries.”39 A line, however, does not explain the 
breadth and depth of global implications created by borders and efforts to secure them. 
Also not well conceived are all the intersections between borders and the domestic and 
global landscape, a landscape upon which strategies maneuver to shape 21st century 
security goals. As earlier described, literature is inconsistent as to how borders are 
defined, and what border security means. This chapter explores a historical review of 
U.S. borders, and what purpose they were seen to serve in the past. This chapter is not 
intended to be a comprehensive historical record, nor is it a thorough accounting of all 
nuances related to historical events. The objective is to provide the reader with a 
historical perspective of how and why competing perceptions and goals of the U.S. 
border exist present day. Understanding the history will better elucidate why confusion is 
growing insofar as comprehending what border security is (or should be). 
Borders can be at once, a line, region, corridor, community, a reflection of values, 
and a node. One constant throughout border dialogue, however, is the view of a 
separation between “us” and “them;” an intersection between cultures, political control, 
resource ownership, control of transit from one point to another, and a division between 
national identities. It would, therefore, prove helpful to become familiar with how U.S. 
borders have evolved to present day, to understand border security better as a CAS.  
38 Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945), 131. 
39 “Border,” Oxforddictionaries.com, accessed September 5, 2013, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/American_english/border. 
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A. THE FOUNDING 
Before, and immediately after, the United States achieved independence from 
Great Britain in 1783, national borders were not thought of in terms of distinct 
geographical lines. Rather, Europeans and colonists associated boundaries for territorial 
control of natural resources, trade, and frontier exploration. The intent of boundaries was 
to mark an area for further expansion. Land was wealth (materials and people), and 
waters were transportation highways and strongholds. With control of the seaports, a 
nation (or entrepreneur) controlled the wealth of the land to which it was connected. That 
wealth was natural resources and labor. The trade of those resources was the source of 
power. Control the territorial waters, lakes, and rivers, and the means by which to acquire 
that power was also controlled. The 1776 declaration issued by colonists to Great Britain 
was itself created as a direct result of restrictions placed upon resources, trade, and port 
commerce; restrictions that challenged merchant powers.40  
1. Frontier and Wilderness Exploration 
Following the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783, the concept of national 
borders was still initially one of an opportunity for expansion. Fortification and control of 
physical border demarcations was not of conceptual importance, outside of perimeter 
security for trading posts, homes, states, towns, and seats of power. Rather, the goal of 
any national boundary was to serve as a frontier for growth and trade exchange. 
Westward, for example, the Northwest Territory (region west of the Allegheny 
mountains, northwest of the Ohio river), was acquired from Britain at the end of the war. 
This territory was seen as a wilderness to be explored and settled. These territories were 
frontiers where sovereignty of nation-states (Spain, France, England, and later Mexico, 
and Russia) blurred into and out of one another, gradually over hundreds, and at times, 
thousands of acres.  
40 Vincent Wilson, Jr., ed., The Book of Great American Documents (Brookfield: MD: American 
History Research Associates, 2003), 11. 
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2. Geological Boundaries and Settlements 
The territorial lands were not seen as part of the Union; in other words, 
inhabitants of the territories were not inherently endowed with any participatory rights of 
governance. The only boundaries per se were the geological landmarks of mountains and 
rivers. As an illustration, the Continental Congress passed the Ordinance of 1787, which 
documented a framework for requirements of settlement. The ordinance established rules 
for inhabitants and settlers within the Northwest Territory, namely to contribute payment 
towards debts and protect interests of the United States The ordinance also stipulated 
terms for any settled region within the territory, to form a recognized state. This 
ordinance set the groundwork for westward expansion and growth, and demonstrated that 
borders were not as yet formally defined.41  
3. From Independent States to Federalist Union 
By 1786, just three years after the Revolutionary War, each state viewed their 
boundaries as borders that must be defended, and under the Articles of Confederation 
they were empowered to do so. The 13 states were independent, joined loosely by the 
Articles of Confederation (ratified in 1781), as a measure of common defense from other 
empires.42 They built their own armies, created their own tariff laws (fees placed upon 
imported goods), negotiated trade agreements with foreign entities, and printed their own 
paper and coin currencies. New Jersey even created its own customs service. The absence 
of interstate commerce controls and standardization was what led to the Philadelphia 
convention of states, which in turn led to the dissolution of the confederacy and 
formation of the federal system known today. Again, issues of trade influenced this 
change. The Constitutional Convention, as it became known, was initially intended to 
revise the Articles of Confederation, with the sole objective of improving U.S. trade and 
commerce, and interstate cooperation. The convention ended with an agreement to  
 
 
41 Wilson, Jr., ed., The Book of Great American Documents, 21–25. 
42 Library of Congress, “Articles of Confederation,” Primary Documents in American History, (n.d.), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/articles.html. 
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disband the confederation and replace it with a new, strengthened, three-branch federal 
structure. It was from trade and border dynamics that the U.S. nation-state was formed, 
through the emergence of the U.S. Constitution in 1787.43  
Upon enactment of the Constitution in 1789, the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) 
was created by the fifth act of Congress. The objective of the service was to regulate and 
collect tariffs on all commerce entering U.S. territory through the national points of 
delivery (now ports of entry). Exports were not yet recognized as a priority for control 
measures. The USCS was the milestone that marked the formal shift of focus from state 
borders to those of the nation-state. The shift was grounded in the objective of revenue 
collection, not defense. The border was seen not as a line requiring security posture, but a 
perimeter with nodes of economic opportunity (sea ports). The USCS also served as the 
first Public Health Service and Bureau of Standards, given that contagious diseases 
carried by seamen, and standardization of weights and measures, were recognized as a 
critical part of the revenue paradigm. By 1835, the national debt accumulated from years 
of war, was paid in full from duties collected at the new national border.44 It was during 
this period, 1789 forward, that the federal government began formalizing the northern 
and southern U.S. borders, through war, battles, treaties, and occupation.  
B. THE NORTH 
Looking north, both the British and the United States maintained a naval presence 
in the Great Lakes following the end of the Revolutionary War. The region was 
maintained as a pseudo-militarized area, given the strategic location for both control of 
land and inland seaport access. Throughout the War of 1812, both sides used Lake Erie 
and Lake Ontario as their fleet manufacturing zones, on which a number of battles were 
also fought. Both countries entered into a shipbuilding competition (i.e., arms race) in the 
lake border region following the end of that war. The lake border region served as a 
battlefield, manufacturing, transit, and trade zone, concurrently. Oddly, during this time, 
43 Wilson, Jr., The Book of Great American Documents, 29. 
44 Anne Saba, “The U.S. Customs Service,” U.S. Customs Today, February 2003, (n.d.), http://www. 
cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2003/February/always.xml. 
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trade between the two countries increased. It was this burgeoning trade relationship, and 
wariness of war in general, that led to a disarmament agreement six years later. The 
Rush-Bagot Pact, also known as the Convention of 1818, established a limit of no more 
than two naval patrol vessels per country, with authority to navigate the Great Lakes. The 
waterways were conceived, from that point forward, as a demilitarized zone. The Rush-
Bagot Pact also aligned the border just west of Angle Inlet (Minnesota) to the south, at 
the 49th parallel, then extending west until it reached the Rocky Mountains.  
Also following the War of 1812, a number of land border disputes remained 
between the United States and British North America (now Canada). These disputes 
originated from the 1783 Treaty of Paris (the treaty that ended the Revolutionary War). 
Many commissions served over the next 30 years to negotiate agreeable boundaries. For 
example, islands off the coast of Maine were negotiated in favor of Great Britain. The St. 
Lawrence and other rivers near the Great Lakes region were divided to allow both 
countries to navigate for defense, transit, and trade. In 1842, the last of the northern 
borders east of what is now Minnesota, were resolved via the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty.45  
It is important to note that the border negotiations were not all about marking 
lines or areas for the purposes of sovereignty. Borders themselves served as resources for 
trade, and were subject to negotiation for use. For example, it was agreed to permit the 
United States indefinite fishing rights along the Newfoundland and Labrador coastlines.  
The Rocky Mountains, and everything west and northwest of those, fell within 
what was called “The Oregon Territory,” and was jointly occupied by both countries for 
63 years. At the time, Russia claimed the Bering Straits for the purposes of commercial 
fishing, and both the United States and Great Britain claimed rights of use and settlement 
of the Oregon Territory; claims based on exploration teams and fur trading posts. It was 
not until masses of people migrated to the west via the “Oregon Trail” that U.S. 
45 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1801–1829, Rush-Bagot Pact,” 
(n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1801–1829/Ruch-Bagot. 
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congressional expansionists pushed hard for full control of the region (and its resources). 
The northwestern border known today was negotiated via the 1846 Oregon Treaty.46  
During this time, social and political tensions over slavery had been brewing in 
the debate halls of Congress. Citizens were starting to polarize between abolitionist and 
pro-slavery ideologies. In 1839, the legitimacy of the slave trade was challenged via two 
legal cases. These cases expanded the dialogue of slavery beyond domestic social and 
political debate. Foreign diplomacy, state sovereignty, reach of executive powers, 
borders, and values all coalesced. This dynamic eruption occurred in large part because 
of what is known as “The Amistad Case.” The Spanish cargo ship La Amistad ran 
aground on the coastal border of New York, after Africans who had been abducted and 
sold for the purposes of enslavement, mutinied, and took over the ship.  
Spain viewed the ship and everything on it as the Queens property, and the arrest 
of the traders, proposed freeing of the slaves, and confiscation of the cargo was seen as a 
slight upon the Queens honor. Further, as Spain viewed the Africans as property, that 
country interpreted the proceedings as being a violation of their 1795 trade treaty with the 
United States. The cargo was being ruled on in federal court, on salvage claims. The 
Spanish traders were being tried in Connecticut, on state charges. The state proceedings 
were not subject to federal jurisdiction, and the President could not interfere with the 
judiciary process in the federal salvage case, which included the abductees. The federal 
judge ruled in favor of the Africans, and the case went to the Supreme Court on appeal. 
John Quincy Adams presented the defense, and argued on grounds of American ideals. 
He argued that the taking away of the equal rights of Africans did not align with the 
intent of the trade treaty, and that the ruling on the freedom of the Africans was a test of 
the “ideals [America] espoused abroad.”47 The Africans were freed and returned to their 
country. The Supreme Court ruling was heavily disfavored by the southern states, and 
increased domestic tensions regarding slavery in general. This case demonstrates the 
46 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1830–1860, The Oregon Territory, 
1846,” (n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830–1860/OregonTerritory. 
47 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1830–1860, The Amistad Case,” 
(n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830–1860/Amistad. 
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juxtaposition of state with federal, legal with moral, and domestic with foreign 
influences, and how the geographic border first intersected with them all in U.S. history.  
C. THE SOUTH 
Looking southward, southwestern expansion of the United States added further 
complexity and influence of the national borders. The growth of the Transcontinental 
Railroad drove much of the southwest border expansion effort. The railroad expanded 
viability of settlements, extended the reach and speed of trade, and would later lead to 
growth of many new forms of manufacturing (e.g., steel mills, coal mining, assembly 
lines). These new forms of industry in turn created newer domestic implications, such as 
urbanization, labor rights, child welfare, and pollution. The limited view of the new rail 
transportation industry was that it presented an opportunity for more profit, territory, and 
trade. Acquiring the land needed to construct it was the primary objective of southwest 
expansion. 
One year before the United States negotiated the Webster-Ashburton Treaty with 
Great Britain to the north, it annexed the Republic of Texas. The United States had 
attempted to annex the Republic in 1836, after it had won its independence from Mexico; 
however, this move was met with a threat of war. To avoid another costly war, the United 
States and the Republic of Texas opted to delay annexation, but maintained diplomatic 
relations for the next nine years.  
In 1845, with a budget surplus as a result of USCS duty collections, and a 
growing cosmic ideology referred to as “manifest destiny,” the United States signed the 
Treaty of Annexation; an offensive maneuver upon Mexico. In response, as anticipated, 
Mexico severed diplomatic relations and declared war on the United States. The 
Mexican-American War lasted three years, and ended in 1848 with the signing of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo.48  
U.S. boundary objectives added a new dynamic to U.S. foreign policy during this 
period. Driven by goals associated with trade and revenue, along with an almost religious 
48 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1830–1860, Annexation of Texas,” 
(n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830–1860/TexasAnnexation. 
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ideology of destiny, the United States was now willing to go to war with established 
nations for the purpose of expansion. Starting from 1776, with an objective of 
unmolested colonial trade, to 1848, inciting war with an objective of expanding trade 
routes, the shift of what borders were seen to serve would have global implications for 
years to come.  
D. THE CIVIL WAR 
Just 22 years after the Supreme Court ruling on the Amistad case, 11 states 
submitted their notices of succession from the Union. These 11 states formed the 
Confederate States of America supported primarily by foreign finance and supply. The 
Confederacy leveraged their supply of cotton exports to garner the foreign support. Both 
the cotton exports and the imports of foreign support were transferred via southern 
seaports ports of entry. The border became a critical supply line for the survivability of 
the ceded states. The Union, in turn, blockaded the southern seaports in an attempt to 
sever the supply chain, and stall the confederate economy. Four years later, at the end of 
the Civil War, the southern economy was indeed in total collapse. In addition to the 
Union instituting seaport blockades, it also maneuvered diplomatic powers to encourage 
other European nations not to provide aid to the south. Through the events of the 
succession and subsequent Civil War, borders no longer simply regions for revenue, 
expansion, trade, or aid exchange. They became a tool for manipulation of the land (and 
the government on that land), a tool of domestic and foreign political influence and 
sanction.49  
E. GOING GLOBAL 
The evolution of border dynamics was not constrained to the North American 
continent. The United States, with its vast naval fleet (a product of the arms race with 
Great Britain on the northern border), extended its reach throughout the Pacific. 
Colonizing new territories forms an extension of national borders, including maritime,  
 
49 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1861–1865, The Civil War and 
International Diplomacy,” (n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1861–1865. 
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and later, air borders. A nation has control over the lands, resources, and people of their 
colonies; hence, expansion efforts moved beyond the continent towards China and the 
Philippines, among others.  
Motivated by the appeal of further profits (and national revenue) by expanding 
trade markets, the United States entered into the Pacific region. Although it had been 
trading with China since 1784, a formal bilateral trade treaty was not signed until 1844. 
The Treaty of Wangxia allowed for the establishment of diplomatic and trade outposts to 
be located on Chinese land.  
The First Opium War (1839–1842) between Great Britain and China marked the 
beginning of U.S. engagements in transnational drug issues. Following the lead of the 
British, U.S. merchants discovered and capitalized on the profits to be made from opium, 
and imported the drug into the United States. Opium, combined with an increased 
domestic demand for Chinese products (porcelain, tea, furniture and silks) altered the 
balance of trade with China. The United States had an established trade relationship with 
China since 1784. Initially, the United States exported more goods to China than imports 
received in return. Along with improved border and trade efficiencies, and the 
introduction of opium to the population, domestic demand led to a reversal of trade flow; 
the United States then imported more goods from China than it exported to China in 
return. This imbalance led to financial dependencies that exist to this day. The cross-
border drug issue also led to evolutions of U.S. citizenry protection abroad. The United 
States agreed with China that any American caught smuggling opium, or found to be 
involved in the illicit trade some other way, would be tried and sentenced under Chinese 
law. The United States, however, would retain the right to carry out the sentence upon the 
accused.50  
Beyond China, expansion of the U.S. presence into the Pacific region marked yet 
another extension of national boundaries. The Philippine Islands were strategically 
targeted for colonization, no longer just for resources, trade, and diplomatic influence, but 
50 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1830–1860, The First Opium War,” 
(n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830–1860/China1. 
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also for military expansion.51 The perception of borders now encompassed both 
economic and military interests. This mutation led to significantly broader political and 
trade-based engagements, both at the local and regional levels. These developments 
guided U.S. domestic and foreign policies well into the new century.  
F. THE 20TH CENTURY 
Borders had evolved markedly from 1776 to the 1900s. The concept of boundary 
lines emerged from what was once a frontier concept, to a trade region, revenue 
collection point, ideological control (manifest destiny), political control, foreign 
influence, and military expansion. These goals merged into a kaleidoscope of national 
interests significantly expanding the realm of global influence and U.S. diplomacy.  
As the United States settled the remaining territories on the mainland throughout 
the 18th and 19th centuries, it also expanded its reach into the global sphere. The United 
States felt confident to continue expanding its international expansion efforts into the first 
part of the 20th century. Following successful colonization and trade in the Pacific 
region, the United States proceeded to enhance its “sphere of influence” (expanding 
markets, colonies, and control throughout Western Hemisphere). A new dynamic was 
created under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. The national boundaries, economy, 
domestic growth, and foreign policy had all centered around trade through the borders. 
Economic interests were the pillars of all domestic and foreign policy efforts. In fact, 
many, if not most, foreign policies evolved from domestic border dynamics. President 
Wilson had a new objective; to use foreign policy as a platform for defining and 
spreading ideals, morality, and democracy.52 This objective formed the 20th century 
version of “manifest destiny,” and would influence both domestic and foreign policies 
throughout the century to come.  
From a border perspective, this strategic shift complicated the landscape greatly. 
It created a pluralistic purpose, in which the domestic borders required a focus on 
51 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1830–1860, Maritime Expansion 
Across Pacific,” (n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830–1860/PacificExpansion. 
52 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1914–1920, Wilsonian Diplomacy,” 
(n.d.), http://history.state.gov/milestones/1914–1920. 
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economic interests to continue functioning as they had been designed, yet exportation of 
goods, ideas, values and the like were to be framed by an esoteric ideology. Those 
exportations, however, were dependent upon the volume of import flows. Further 
complicating the policy landscape, the Executive Office was asking the American people 
to adopt the ideologies that would be put forth on the foreign front. This juxtaposition of 
ideology and economy would later prove to be the root issue of present day immigration 
reform and border security debates, economic interests vs. ideological values.  
The remainder of the 20th century continued expansion of foreign affairs and 
trade interests. Even with the short-duration U.S. isolationist position around the world 
wars, necessity required continued economic and military growth, and broadened foreign 
involvement. Private investment continued to influence U.S. engagement abroad, and the 
rise of fascism and communism anchored the Wilsonian objective of ideologically 
defined foreign policy.  
History has shown U.S. border interests drove foreign involvement, and in turn, 
drove the domestic economy. The objective of the border had been almost exclusively 
economic by nature. The U.S. border served also another purpose that had not been fully 
capitalized on up until the 20th century. That purpose related not to management of 
goods that crossed the border, but to the people who crossed and stayed. Immigration 
began as a coveted and marketed industry to draw settlers to populate the fledgling 
nation-state, later evolving towards restrictions and controls in response to racism, labor 
disputes, health issues, and ideological threats to the governing body. 
G. THE ISSUE OF PEOPLE 
From 1882 forward, a new dominant interest arose and was found to be a 
powerful influence on economy, politics, and foreign relations. Labor and race 
interconnected with both economic and cultural mores since the earliest days of the 
United States. These interconnections were what led to the formalization of immigration, 




accounting of naturalization and immigration laws and issues. The objective of this 
section is to familiarize the reader briefly with when and why the border became a central 
issue in the topic of immigration.  
At first, immigration and naturalization laws limited specific races, ethnicities, or 
nationalities from entering the United States; later evolving to incorporate more complex 
concerns related to education, criminal history, political affiliation, burden on the state, 
and loyalties, among others. Of note, states determined how they would regulate 
immigration into their territories up until 1875, when, by ruling of the Supreme Court, it 
was deemed a federal responsibility.53  
Numerous naturalization acts, laws, and restrictions were enacted before any 
comprehensive immigration laws came about. The primary goal of the United States, 
from 1790 to 1882, was to restrict citizenship. With citizenship came the opportunity to 
acquire land and wealth, vote, and compete in labor markets. Also with citizenship came 
cultural influence and the possibilities of heterogeneity, and risk to public value changes 
that diversity would likely create. Unlike claims for citizenship, immigration was very 
much desired in the early years of the nation. Increases in the population were seen as 
helpful in settling the west, and provided a larger (cheaper) labor pool for expanding 
railroad, coal, textile, and steel industries (i.e., export trade).  
The naturalization, however, of diverse races, ethnicities, and nationalities was 
seen as a disruption to the social identity and political stability of American society. This 
disruption was seen to occur from a society and economy that was, at the time, facing 
massive influxes of poor laborers as a result of global economic, political, and social 
unrest.  
In 1819, Congress required the Secretary of State to report on the number of 
immigrants arriving in the United States. To do this, shipmasters were required to provide 
USCS a manifest of all aliens on board their ship, along with their cargo manifests.  
 
53 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service—Populating a 
Nation: A History of Immigration and Naturalization,” (n.d.), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history 
/legacy/ins_history.xml. 
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Controls, restrictions, and admissions processes were not yet in place. People could move 
freely into and out of the country. The manifests simply served as a reporting and survey 
tool.  
Mass migrations into the United States from Europe started in the 1840s, as a 
direct result of famines and political revolutions abroad. By 1862, during the Civil War, 
European immigration escalated in response to the Homestead Act, which was a law 
granting up to 160 acres to anyone who wanted to settle in the west. The following year, 
in 1863, European immigrants rioted in New York City in response to the Union draft. 
This riot was the first evidence of political shifts occurring as a result of, what was later 
found to be, the spread of communist and anarchist view; a spread associated with 
immigrants and border crossing.  
German, Irish, Southern and Eastern European immigrants dominated the cross-
border flow during the latter years of the 19th century. Eastern European Jews dominated 
the immigrant flow through the first two decades of the 20th century. Yet it was the 
Chinese, the primary laborers (next to the Irish) for the Transcontinental Railroad, who 
were subject to the first restrictive measures. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act denied any 
further Chinese immigrants from entering the United States, for a period of 10 years. The 
law would be renewed twice; the second without an end date.  
That same year, the Immigration Act of 1882 was ratified. This law created 
ineligible classes of immigrants, and required that all arriving immigrants at seaports pay 
a tax. The economics of border revenue collection had been extended to the growing 
immigration inflows, and helped the Union pay for the Civil War. Aside from the 
Chinese and a few minor ineligible classes (e.g., “lunatics”), immigration of people was 
still unrestricted. Manifests of names were provided, taxes were paid (50 cents), and 
movement could continue unabated.  
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, revolutions were occurring in a 
number of European countries, communism was on the rise, and Germany and Ireland 
were experiencing crop failures and famine. Communism and anarchy were spreading 
abroad in response to the brutalities inflicted upon Southern and Eastern Europeans. 
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These political beliefs came to the United States with the immigrants that held them. As 
the U.S. trade, manufacturing, and ideological expansion objectives continued, 
populations abroad began to see the United States as an opportunity to escape war, 
poverty, unrest, and hunger. The very policies that used the borders to expand foreign 
influence, and capitalize on wider trade markets, led to the industrial revolution, a 
revolution that created a multitude of social, health, and political issues. Issues which, 
when combined with the immigration of millions escaping social, economic, and political 
issues abroad, resulted in chaos.  
Many dynamic issues contributed to the chaos: aftereffects of slavery, unequal 
status of women, wars, a depression, environmental catastrophes (e.g., Oklahoma 
dustbowl), unemployment, drugs (e.g., Chinese opium), contagious disease, the gold 
rush, and the rise of unions. It was in this context that immigration and national security 
collectively became associated with U.S. borders.  
It was in 1891 when the dynamics of immigration began getting more complex. 
Restrictions against contagious diseases, moral turpitude, and polygamy entered the 
frame, and the first federal immigration office was established.54 When an Eastern 
European anarchist shot President McKinley in 1901, immigration restrictions were 
extended to all anarchists and political extremists. The Expatriation Act, a law that 
stripped women of their U.S. citizenship if they married a foreigner, was ratified in 1907. 
It was during this time period that immigration became associated with social value 
liabilities.  
Also in 1907, the United States and Japan entered into an informal “Gentleman’s 
Agreement,” so that Japan would restrict their number of U.S.-bound emigrants if the 
United States would address the discrimination being experienced by Japanese in 
California. The Japanese would later perceive the Immigration Act of 1924, which 
excluded all Asians from immigrating to the United States, as a violation of this 
agreement, and created a strain on diplomatic relations up to the time of Pearl Harbor. 
54 The Office of the Superintendent of Immigration fell under the U.S. Department of Treasury. Up to 
1891, the U.S. Customs Service managed the immigrant taxes, ship manifests, and Chinese exclusion 
requirements.  
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These events illustrate how political unrest, social influence, and foreign relations 
intersect at the border, much like with the 1839 La Amistad case. In less than 100 years, 
this intersection combined with technological growth, evolved past diplomatic and legal 
debate; it led to attack and engagement in a world war.  
H. SUMMARY 
The concept of boundary lines emerged from what was once a frontier concept, 
and with that emergence came trade, ideology (manifest destiny), political control, 
foreign influence, and military expansion. These goals merged into a kaleidoscope of 
national interests that hinge on borders and concepts of sovereignty. Borders serve as a 
method to pay debt (revenue collection), a means to expand transportation, settlement, 
and power (rail road, manifest destiny, military positioning), a hub through which to 
transfer goods (trade corridors), and a source for cultural exchange (regional 
intersections). History has demonstrated the vast interconnections and interdependencies 
boundaries serve.  
As domestic and world events and policies began shifting the concept of borders, 
a new socio-political and economic perspective emerged, threat. Borders, in form and 
function, are more than a line separating countries. They serve as areas, regions, 
corridors, frontiers, and political and cultural interfaces. They are also economic hubs, 
influence foreign diplomacy, reflect values (and fears), and can be used to start wars. 
These dynamics contribute to the complexity that is border security, and will be 
considered in development of the conceptual model that is to come later in this thesis. 
The next chapter explores some of the perceived threats that border security policies are 
intended to address.  
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IV. PERCEPTION OF THREATS 
After having made their domestic animals dumb and having carefully 
prevented these quiet creatures from daring to take any step beyond the 
lead-strings to which they have fastened them, these guardians then show 
them the danger which threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. 
Now this danger is not really so very great; for they would presumably 
learn to walk after some stumbling. However, an example of this kind 
intimidates and frightens people out of all further attempts.55  
–Immanuel Kant 
The previous chapters described the inconsistent, multi-faceted, and ambiguous 
framework within which borders are understood, and what objective(s) borders 
themselves have been seen to serve. As a consequence, policies associated with securing 
borders have been (and are) equally inconsistent and complex. It remains unclear how a 
consistent approach to identifying threats that jeopardize borders could be possible, 
without understanding the very nature of borders. Similarly, clear definitions of 
“security” and “threat” are necessary to clearly articulate strategies, and allocate 
resources based upon community need rather than agenda. This chapter looks to explore 
some open source concepts of threats, to discuss some contradictions briefly in the 
understanding of what constitutes a threat and limitations to the coherence of border 
security that these issues create. The objective of this exploration is simply to call into 
question the common assumptions of what a threat is understood to be.  
A. HOW BORDER SECURITY IS CURRENTLY DEFENDED  
Contemporary border security policies are control-oriented, targeting one or more 
activity or event-oriented threats, e.g., drug trafficking, illegal immigration, trade 
55 Thomas K. Abbott, trans., “Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in Basic Writings of 
Kant, ed. Allen W. Wood (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 135. 
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facilitation, terrorism.56 Rarely do these policies define “security,” “threat,” or 
“border.”57 Although “security” remains an undefined, broad, and highly complex 
concept, the assumption is that by expanding control-centric programs, such as the border 
fence, surveillance technology, and more law enforcement personnel, it will be reached. 
Some border security issues could indeed be addressed through efficient, technologically 
based control standards. Improving the mechanical flow of traffic through a port of entry 
(POE), for example, or installing ballistic glass on facilities to mitigate effects of bomb 
blasts. Actors, networks of individuals, and groups, however, perpetrate activity-oriented 
threats. The social nature of these networks renders threat activities unpredictable, due to 
their adaptability.58 Furthermore, the cause-effect relationship behind border threat 
activities cannot be known until after an event occurs.59 Drugs can be interdicted through 
surveillance and screening, but whether those drugs have a direct connection to 
transnational terrorist organizations (TTOs) cannot be determined until after a seizure is 
made. Drugs could be produced and distributed by a local, independent operator (e.g., 
homemade ecstasy or garage-based hydroponic marijuana). On the other hand, they could 
be a product of a global criminal network, with connections to human  
 
56 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Fiscal Year 2009–2014 Strategic Plan,” 2009, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/mission/strategic_plans/strategic_plan_09_14.ctt/strategic_pla
n_09_14.pdf; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Written Testimony of U.S. Coast Guard Deputy for 
Operations Policy & Capabilities Rear Admiral William Lee for a House Committee on Homeland 
Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,” February 26, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2013/02/26/written-testimony-us-customs-and-border-protection-house-committee-homeland-security; 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations, A Line in the Sand: 
Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border (Washington, DC: 2006), http://www.house.gov/sites/ 
members/tx10_mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016 (Washington, DC: 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/DHS%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf; Marc R. Rosenblum, Border Security: Immigration 
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, CRS Report R42138 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 2012), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/180681.pdf. 
57 The recognition of the absence of this clarification in general throughout security related debates, 
draws upon the discussion put forth in David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of 
International Studies no. 23 (1997): 5–26.  
58 Anand Desai, “Adaptive Complex Enterprises,” Communications of the ACM-Adaptive Complex 
Enterprises, Special Issue 48, no. 5 (May 2005): 32–35. 
59 For a discussion of coherence and complexity, see Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The 
New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 
42, no. 3 (2003): 462–483. 
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trafficking, weapons, and terrorism. The cause can be known only retrospectively; thus, 
placing the source of border threats in the realm of the complex, and inherently 
uncontrollable.60  
The efficacies of border security policies are publicly debated through value-
based and/or empirical arguments as opposed to complex social dynamics. The value-
based positions argue costs of culture, individual rights, the Constitution, or 
classifications of people or groups as good or bad. The empirical arguments, 
alternatively, hinge on statistical analysis of crimes, rates, budget costs, industry profit, 
and judicial or legislative mandates. With the exception of some recent terrorism 
research,61 and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs),62 very little has been 
attempted to understand the geographical, economic, or sociopolitical phenomena driving 
the behaviors of the actors behind border threat activities. Cartels, criminal traffickers, 
and illegal immigrants are labeled as dangers to the homeland, in the same manner 
terrorists have been generically. Rather than exploring the environments influencing 
these subjects, arguments for border security have perpetuated these subjects as dangers 
to the nation that can be controlled. Much like the early assumptions of terrorists,63 the 
tactics and intents of criminal organizations and actors are generally assumed to be that of 
strategic choice; that is, rational and reasoned power struggles, thus easily controlled 
60 For a discussion of how the Cynefin Framework categories of ‘known, knowable, chaotic, 
disordered, and complex’ require differing strategic approaches to Homeland Security, see Christopher 
Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: Shape Patterns, Not Programs,” Homeland Security Digital 
Library, October 2006. 
61 See David W. Brannan et al., “Talking to “Terrorists:” Towards an Independent Analytical 
Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (Fife, Scotland: 
Taylor & Francis, 2000) 24, no. 4, 6; Angela Dalton and Victor Asal, “Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why 
Do Organizations Deploy Women in Violent Terrorist Attacks?,” Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 
10 (2011): 802–819); James J. Forest, “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970–2010: Is Ideological 
Orientation Relevant?,” Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (September 2012): 769–797; Megan K. McBride, 
“The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies,” 
Terrorism & Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 560–581. 
62 Ben Riley and Kathleen Kiernan, eds., “The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations 
(TCOs): A Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Security,” Kiernan Group Holdings, 
March 2013, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733208. 
63 Brannan et al., “Talking to “Terrorists:” Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the 
Study of Violent Substate Activism,” 6. 
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through capture or sanction.64 Dismantle an organizational hierarchy, or apprehend an 
individual, and the threat ceases to exist. In the case of criminal cross-border activities, 
dynamics of culture, group behavior, globalization, and sociopolitical pressures (and 
weaknesses) are generally absent from policy rationale. Consequently, the patterns 
created by actors (licit and illicit) that directly or indirectly connect to the border domain 
are vaguely, if at all, understood.  
Although borders and the actors interfacing with them are opaque, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) has, nonetheless, a strategic mission documented to 
securing the border.65 In (FY) 2012 alone, DHS requested nearly $2.13 billion 
specifically for border security.66 Given the significant costs (qualified and quantified) 
and CAS dynamics threat activities and programs to contain them produce, it is prudent 
to understand better how threats are understood.  
B. THE CONCEPT OF THREAT 
Variable means can be used to label someone or something a threat. A threat can 
be a situation or activity that could cause harm.67 Threats can also be people or things 
that may cause damage or danger.68 “Harm” and “could” do not provide the necessary 
framework by which to determine appropriate resource deployments. Harm is a 
subjective concept, and the range of probabilities is vast when something “could” happen. 
Similarly, “situation” or “activities” render an ambiguity such that policy development is 
64 Ed Peaco, “Ice Partnering to Fight Crime on a Global Scale,” American Board for Certification in 
Homeland Security, (n.d.), http://www.abchs.com/ihs/SUMMER2012/ihs_articles_cover.php; U.S. 
Department of Justice, Statement of Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, (November 1, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/2011/crm-testimony-111101.html; U.S. Department of 
Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization,” Press Release, October 11, 2012, 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1733.aspx. 
65 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secure and Manage Our Borders,” (n.d.), 
http://www.dhs.gov/secure-and-manage-borders. 
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Budget-In-Brief: Fiscal Year 2012,” (n.d.), 9–10, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf. 
67 Macmillandictionary.com,” “Threat,” (n.d.), http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/ 
american/threat. 
68 “Threat,” Oxforddictionaries.com, accessed September 5, 2013, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/American_english/threat?q=threat. 
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left to personal or organizational interpretation. Even more subjectivity exists with 
“damage” or “danger.” By what measure are these understood? In the context of border 
security, representatives in Congress broadly posit defense against anything that threatens 
“freedom, security, and our way of life.”69 Evidenced by centuries of statecraft, wars, and 
independence struggles, this nebulous and unsubstantiated concept is itself a threat. 
Throughout policy and literature, attention is predominantly directed towards programs 
and grant frameworks by which resources are to be distributed or trained to manage 
threats. Very little, if any, discussion exists questioning the very assumption of what 
constitutes a threat, security, or boundaries of security measures. This gap does not 
enable the author to compare or contrast threat definitions clearly, although exploring 
differing approaches to threat management may draw some insights.  
1. One Perspective of Managing Threats: Preparedness 
The U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) calls for capabilities to prepare 
for national level threats. The PPD-8 limits a threat to an event, excluding people and 
things from consideration. National level threats are further described as either: 1) acts of 
terrorism, 2) cyber attacks (terrorism + hostile nation), 3) pandemics (naturally occurring 
+ engineered), and 4) natural disasters. The threats are separated as though they are 
unique and distinct from one another. PPD-8 does not take into consideration that 
behavioral patterns can evolve and adapt, which can lead to convergence of multiple 
events and unknown consequences. Rather, the policy is narrowly focused on singular 
events of which cause and consequence are known.  
In support of PPD-8, the DHS developed the Strategic National Risk Assessment 
(SNRA), as shown in Table 1. This assessment created thresholds to measure when an 
event reaches the national level, and categorized them into “groups” and “types.” The 
SNRA identified three threat groups and a total of 23 threat types. Natural disasters are 
detailed with nine types, technological and accidental threats have four types, and 
69 House Committee on Homeland Security, “McCaul Border Security Guiding Principles and 




                                                 
adversarial and human caused threats have 10 types.70 “Hazard,” “risk,” and “threat” are 
interchangeably applied to describe issues detrimental to domestic security, but the 
assessment is clear not to include ‘‘enduring” or “steady-state” activities, such as drug 
trafficking and intellectual property violations.71 In short, the DHS perceives a threat as a 
determinate event, with known cause and effect.  
 
Threat Group Threat 
Types National Event Designation Thresholds 
1 Natural Hazards 9 
• $100M direct loss caused by nature (flood, earthquake, 
hurricane, wildfire) 
• Foot and mouth in domestic livestock 
• 25% gross clinical attack rate caused by pandemic influenza  
• 50 ft tsunami on Pacific Coast 
• Lava flows, ash, smoke in Pacific NW 
2 Accidental Hazards 4 
• 100+ hospitalizations and multi-State response caused by 
biological agent 
• 1+ fatality caused by dam failure  
• 1+ fatality caused by toxic chemical release  






• Non-state actors only 
• 1+ fatality and assault tactics 
• Any airline crash into physical target 
• Acquire, weaponize and release CBRN 
• Acquire or create radioactive material 
• Deploy IED and 1+ fatality or injury 
• $1B direct loss due to data exploitation 
• $1M direct loss or 1+ fatality (cyber vector) 
Table 1. National Threats Aligned with PPD-8.72 
Per the quantitative thresholds noted in the SNRA, a national threat generally 
equates to method+death+direct cost of $1M to $1B. The methodology of classification, 
categorization, and measurement is inconsistent with the stated objective of the PPD-8, 
which again is preparation. Preparation assumes consequences are predictable. Given the 
interconnected and interdependent trade, social, cultural, political, and financial systems 
created over the past century, the complexity of costs resulting from a national threat 
70 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of 
PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach Toward a Secure and Resilient Nation,” 2011, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf, 2–3. 
71 Ibid., 6. 
72 Ibid., adapted from SNRA chart on 3–4. 
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cannot be known beforehand. Issues that can create a casualty (injury or death) and/or 
economic loss can have multiple actors (state and non-state), multiple effects (direct, 
indirect, domestic, foreign), and interdependent yet disparate “causes.” For example, 
financial market securitization can create foreign investment that creates interdependency 
between domestic employment rates and foreign relations.73 Foreign collapse could result 
in domestic unemployment. Another example includes free trade agreements leading to 
exploitation of foreign government instability by criminal organizations, which in turn, 
creates excessive border violence.74 The girth of social, political, economic and 
diplomatic effects of unemployment rates and violence span well beyond a single threat 
event.75,76 Furthermore, the SNRA does not incorporate a methodology for determining 
the likelihood or probability that a threat would occur; only costs after the fact. It follows 
then, that the DHS scopes preparation within narrow confines of emergency response: 
readiness only for known issues. Preparation is not conceived as the building of readiness 
capabilities of foresight, adaptation, or pre-event intervention. Therefore, “threat” from a 
preparedness perspective, is “right of boom,” constrained only to phenomena that 
standardized, technical fixes can address.  
 
73 Hyman P. Minsky, “Global Consequences of Financial Deregulation,” Hyman P. Minsky Archive, 
Paper 378 (October 2, 1986), 39, 43–44, http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/378.  
74 David J. Danelo, Toward A U.S.-Mexico Security Strategy: The Geopolitics of Northern Mexico and 
the Implications for U.S. Policy (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2011), 6, 15, 17–18, 
https://www.fpri.org/docs/Toward_a_US_Mexico_Security_Strategy_Danelo.pdf. 
75 Marketplace, “The Breakdown: The Ripple Effects of Unemployment,” Marketplace Podcast, 
Hosted by Kai Ryssdal, September 17, 2011, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/breakdown 
/breakdown-ripple-effects-unemployment. 
76 Lee Maril, “The Border Fear Index: How to Measure Border Security,” Homeland Security 
Newswire, December 16, 2011, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111216-the-border-fear-
index-how-to-measure-border-security. 
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2. A Second Perspective of Managing Threats: Prevention 
With respect to the border, intellectual property (IP) theft, smuggling, and 
terrorism are recognized as border threats.77 These threats are understood as activities 
that given their recurring nature require protectionist enforcement strategies, as opposed 
to preparedness.78 As noted in the SNRA, the DHS conceives these threats as “enduring” 
(without end), and thus, not within the realm of preparedness capability building. This 
distinction is important. Preparedness is a proactive posture, intended to ensure effective 
response. The concept of preparedness infers that the consequences of a threat are 
understood and manageable; that the nation, economy, and people can effectively recover 
from the impact, even though the probability of impact may not be unknown.79 
Contrarily, protectionism intuits that consequences of a threat are not entirely understood, 
or if they were, they would be so egregious that no amount of preparation could 
effectively manage them; recovery would be unlikely.  
Protection, thus, is utilized as a preventive security posture; a posture that can 
create unintended consequences as illustrated in Chapter II.80 The assumption is that the 
irrevocable effects of these threats crossing the geo-political border warrant a defensive 
strategy. Prevent IP theft, drug trafficking, terrorism and illegal immigration from 
entering the United States to protect the nation from assumedly irrevocable 
consequences. An illegal immigrant, as an example, would be seen as having a high 
probability of causing physical death or injury to U.S. citizens. On the other hand, cross-
border transfer of illicit IP would be seen as having a high probability of creating 
77 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Statement of James A. Dinkins, Hearing on Border 
Security Threats to the Homeland: DHS’s Response to Innovative Tactics and Techniques, Before the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security,” June 19, 2012, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/120619dinkins.pdf. 
78 Rama Laksmi, “Indian Information Technology Firms Say Border Security Bill Is Protectionist,” 
Washington Post, August 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/06/ 
AR2010080604068.html. 
79 Jeannette Sutton and Kathleen Tierney, “Disaster Preparedness: Concepts, Guidance, and 
Research,” Report prepared for the Fritz Institute Assessing Disaster Preparedness Conference, Sebastopol, 
CA., November 3–4, 2006, 3, http://www.fritzinstitute.org/pdfs/whitepaper/disasterpreparedness-
concepts.pdf. 
80 Kiran Moodley, “WTO Warns of Trade Slowdown Due to Protectionism,” CNBC, reported by Steve 
Sedgwick, September 6, 2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101014240. 
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irreparable economic damage. By this logic, it would stand to reason the U.S. 
government perceives border security as a zero-sum, control effort; a defensive and 
reactive platform from which tactics must be neutralized, otherwise, un-qualified 
“freedom, security, and way of life’’ will be destroyed.  
Yet social systems are adaptive, and so can be their activities. A threat actor will 
adapt to control efforts, which result in the emergence of new threat activities. 
Construction of elaborate underground tunnel networks, for instance, in response to 
installation of a border fence. Although control and regulation focus on threat activities, 
these measures do not prevent actors from adapting. In fact, efforts intended to prevent 
threats and protect the United States, reinforce adversarial adaptation. Is the threat truly 
the process and products of smuggling, IP theft, terrorism, and trade, or is it the 
ideologies of the actors behind these activities? Can control and protection measures 
themselves be perceived as threats to “freedom, security, and way of life”?  
3. The Concept of Measuring Security 
In a recent testimony, Chief Michael Fisher, Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), offered Congress a range of interpretations of the phrase “border security,” to 
include subjective concepts like “living free from fear,” fluid cross-border business, rapid 
cross-border transit, situational awareness, and response capabilities.81 These concepts 
necessarily reflect the growing complexity of managing a globalized and economically 
integrated landscape, but continue to skirt defining threats or describing the dynamics 
that form them. Instead, Fisher falls back on data as indicators of security, such as 
number of personnel, miles of fence, number of home sales, job growth, and tourism 
rates. The economic indicators Fisher referred to were going to be statistics used in the 
now shelved Border Condition Index, but were deemed by former DHS Secretary 
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Written testimony of CBP Border Patrol Chief Michael 
Fisher and Office of Field Operations Assistant Commissioner David Murphy for a House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security Hearing titled “Border Security 
Oversight: Identifying and Responding to Current Threats,” June 27, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2013/06/27/written-testimony-cbp-house-oversight-and-government-reform-subcommittee-national. 
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Napolitano as “a very difficult thing to do in any kind of statistically significant way.”82 
What appears to be happening is an attempt at defining border security through a form of 
reverse engineering. These attempts range from revising risk assessment methodologies, 
developing and re-developing measurements of current enforcement policies, and re-
packaging accepted rates (e.g., apprehensions, interdictions, and number of 
‘partnerships’).83 These efforts do not lend any clarity as to what constitutes a threat, only 
how to better prioritize bureaucratically accepted ones.  
The confusion and ambiguity of what border security is, and how it can be 
measured, is increasingly debated. Although research demonstrates a growing recognition 
of economically unintended consequences that can arise from enforcement policies, the 
concept of threats requiring border security remain unchallenged. For example, Henry 
Willis et al., in “Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-Of-
Entry,” argues that functional capabilities are the best measurement of effectiveness, yet 
tie those capabilities back to the prevention of threats. The threats Willis et al. describe 
are those firmly planted in existing policy: 1) flow of terrorists and their weapons, 2) drug 
smuggling, and 3) illegal migration.84 In other words, measurement is simply a re-
packaging of the status quo. The number of illegal immigrants apprehended and the 
pounds or kilograms of narcotics seized remain central to determining security levels. 
Josiah Heyman argues that the current view of border control is “misplaced and 
counterproductive.”85 He suggests that threats to border security should be limited to 
addressing violent, physical harm to civilians. Addressing this harm, Heyman continues, 
should be balanced with an assessment as to whether a) probability of harm is likely, and 
82 Brian Beutler, “Napolitano: Border Security Trigger ‘Not the Way To Go’ In Immigration Reform,” 
TPMDC, March 26, 2013, http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/03/napolitano-border-security-
trigger-not-the-way-to-go-in-immigration-reform.php. 
83 Joseph Garcia, “On the U.S.-Mexico Border, What Does ‘Secure’ Mean?,” azcentral.com, July 28, 
2013, http://www.azcentral.com/opinions/articles/20130726us-mexican-border-secure-mean.html. 
84 Henry H. Willis et al., “Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry,” 
RAND Technical Report, 2010, 4, http://www.borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/RAND_TR837-
FINAL%20REPORT.pdf. 
85 Josiah McC. Heyman, Guns, Drugs, and Money: Tackling the Real Threats to Border Security, 
(Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, Immigration Policy Center, 2011), 2, http://www. 
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Heyman_-_Drugs_Guns_and_Money_091211.pdf. 
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b) public policy and government response would make a difference.86 Although Marc 
Rosenblum et al. do not question the premise of the function of border security (keep 
things and people out), they do take note to mention social, cultural, environmental, and 
“other impacts” as contributory to public perception of what is threatening.87 The 
characteristics of border security are broadening and becoming increasingly complex. So 
much so, that policy makers have defaulted back to the control paradigm around “people” 
and “things.”  
a. People  
Although the debate continues as to what is and should be the function of 
border security, at least an agreement appears to exist that the concept of security equates 
to protection from a threat. The disagreement erupts from the context and assumptions of 
what those threats consist of, how severe they are, and what trade-offs are acceptable in 
the name of protection and prevention. Differing views of security create differing views 
of threats, and methods to protect against threats. These differences are at the heart of 
security debates.  
Research also demonstrates threats are thought of as actors (or group of 
actors), as opposed to just an activity or event. The concept of people or groups of people 
as threats themselves complicates the protectionist methodology described earlier. In lieu 
of neutralizing specific activities as the objective of border security, actors, organizations, 
and networks of people are seen as the threat requiring mitigation. This dichotomy of 
perspective creates inconsistent approaches to threat assessment, and innumerable policy 
implications, such as indefinite detention, assassination, and retraction of civil liberties, 
for example. Whether a border threat is an activity or person is debatable, yet critical to 
understanding border CAS dynamics.  
If the real threat were indeed the motivations of the people who engage in 
activities, and not the activities themselves, the current border threat mitigation strategy 
86 McC. Heyman, Guns, Drugs, and Money: Tackling the Real Threats to Border Security, 3. 
87 Marc C. Rosenblum, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristen M. Finklea, Border Security: Understanding 
Threats at U.S. Borders, CRS Report R42969 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 2013), 5, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P7167.pdf. 
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would be wholly misaligned. Human intentions are a complex mix of social, 
psychological, and cultural factors, i.e., social and individual identities and behaviors. 
Whether adversarial intentions materialize as profit, revenue, power, vengeance, or 
survival-driven motives, a network of influences upon the social and individual contexts 
of the actor(s) is what catalyzed the intention in the first place. If protectionism is about 
neutralizing a threat before it can create an unmanageable effect; and a threat is seen as a 
personal motive, the influences molding the motive would be the origin of the threat. 
Prevention, thus, would mean neutralizing the influences, not people.  
For example, it is often cited that terrorism is driven by ideology. Terrorist 
acts themselves are intended to further the objectives of the ideology. An act of terrorism 
itself is not the threat; the threat is the influence contributing to the ideology driving the 
radicalization of people to commit the act. Furthermore, ideology must, by its very nature 
of human origin, include the feedback mechanisms and behaviors that keep the ideology 
alive. Simply stated, whatever is threatening an individual or social identity is what 
maintains an ideology. Therefore, if ideology drives terrorist radicalization, so too must 
be the contextual insights of the actors identities. Conceivably, by mitigating the 
perceptions of threat to identity, terrorism might be prevented. How then, does this 
concept relate to border security?  
People, and the social and individual identities that drive them, are not 
border-centric; they are community and environmentally housed. Therefore, the border as 
a preventive measure, as described earlier, does not fit with the terrorist threat. The 
ideology would already be formed by the time the border entered the scene, and as such, 
render prevention moot. Instead, the border would serve as an information highway of 
sorts, a transfer point of ideas crossing from one community to another. The transfer 
would not necessarily require physical crossing. Ideas and ideology can be maintained 
and strengthened virtually as well. Moreover, in an open, democratic society, sharing of 
those ideas cannot be prevented. In this respect, the border serves a three-fold purpose: 1) 
a transfer point for ideas between communities, 2) a surveillance mechanism to observe 
the people sharing the ideas, and 3) to communicate counter-threat (deterrence) and rigid 
protectionist preference (e.g., fencing). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
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should be noted that deterrence efforts communicated via borders demonstrate a failure to 
adapt from Cold War strategies to the 21st century network. Deterrence efforts reflect 
limited insight and comprehension of the contemporary dynamics behind ideological 
threats. Whether the actor named as a “threat” is a TCO, transnational terrorist 
organization (TTO), or illegal immigrant, the dynamics between social and individual 
identities, ideologies, and intentions apply. If people are the threat, it is as a result of 
behavioral dynamics, whether understood or not. Nonetheless, border security is 
officially viewed as the neutralization of an activity and people engaged in those 
activities.  
Although Rosenblum et al. were referring to the public perception of 
illegal immigration, it widened the view of influences that could affect how “threats” can 
be applied to other domains, or tribal lands, for example. An alternative perspective of 
threats to security can be observed by looking at Native American tribes. The treaties that 
created the northern and southern geo-political land borders, as discussed in Chapter III, 
bisected a number (not all) of Native American tribal lands. Of those tribes impacted by 
the boundary lines, contentious border control issues exist associated with tribal 
sovereignty, right to free passage, and continuity of cultural heritage. These bisections, 
and the ever-increasing levels of control policies, have created a threat to maintaining 
their cultures. Certain Native American tribes have, through treaties, been extended rights 
to move freely across boundary lines. Those freedoms have been progressively restrained 
since the 1980s, as border controls became stricter as the War on Drugs grew. The 
Tohono O’odham nation, for instance, have tribal lands in the Sonoran desert spanning 
southern Arizona into northern Mexico.88  
The border fence and controls have resulted in a number of negative 
consequences for the nation. The Tohono O’odham is facing increasing difficulties with 
travel between villages and sacred sites on both sides of the border, as they are no longer 
able to attend religious and cultural gatherings freely. As a result of a lack of 
88 Joshua J. Tonra, “The Threat of Border Security on Indigenous Free Passage Rights in North 




                                                 
documentation (due to remoteness, sovereignty, and poverty issues),89 distance to POEs, 
and risk of deportation, cross-border attendance has reduced significantly, in turn slowing 
the passing down of traditional language and culture to the next generation. The only 
healthcare facility for the nation exists on the U.S. side of the tribal lands, which limits 
access for the tribal members who live on the Mexican side of the reservation.90 Another 
effect has been the “balloon effect” of border enforcement. As cross-border actors shift 
their routes in response to patrol operations, more migratory and criminal traffic is 
passing through Tohono O’odham lands, which has strained tribal resources and 
increased pollution, rescue, body recovery, and crime.91  
Along the northern border, the Mohawks face similar issues. The 
Mohawks, members of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confederacy, span three distinct 
areas that intersect the U.S.-Canadian border: Ogdensburg, NY; St. Regis (Akwasasne), 
NY and Ontario; and Kahnawake, Ontario. Ogdensburg falls completely within U.S. 
territory, the international line splits St. Regis, and Kahnawake falls completely within 
Canadian territory.92 The Canadians placed POEs within tribal lands of Akwasasne, 
which challenged the tribal sovereignty. Documentary constraints also have limited the 
cultural and trade transit between the tribal areas.93  
From a Native American perspective, the “threat” to “security,” that is, the 
threat to “freedom, security, and way of life,” is border control by Mexican, Canadian, 
and U.S. border control agencies. From a tribal perspective, the current strategy for 
border security is threatening native culture, health, and safety.  
 
89 Tonra, “The Threat of Border Security on Indigenous Free Passage Rights in North America,” 249. 
90 Ibid., 250. 
91 Ibid., 251. 
92 Ibid., 244. 
93 Ibid., 223–224, 226. 
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b. Things 
Threat activities, and the people engaged in them, often (although not 
always) involve objects of some kind. The objects are the tools by which an adversary 
acquires profit, revenue, power, vengeance, or survival. The tools can be currency, 
counterfeit materials, information, weapons, people, or drugs. How these objects are used 
is yet another layer of complexity not clearly traceable to border security, but is in any 
case, often the argument with which border policies are justified. That is to say, the 
effects associated with the use of objects are the rationale for border security policies. For 
instance, health and crime effects of drug use, border violence, economic loss, terrorism 
financing, and safety concerns of counterfeit goods are all touted as the rationale for 
stronger border protection. The number of objects interdicted is used to measure the 
success or failure of protection. The hectares of coca plants eradicated in Colombia, or 
the number of illegal immigrants apprehended, or the number of assault weapons 
interdicted enroute to Mexico, for example, are used to measure the success of preventing 
trafficking. One “thing,” intellectual property violations (IPV) are explored next.  
Another object often quantified as a measure of prevention is IPV, which 
are counterfeit and/or compromised objects. Clothing, apparel, shoes, and other 
consumables are the largest percentage of IPV goods, but a growing level of attention is 
being placed on electronics and electronic parts. Although small in number, the effects 
could be catastrophic on many levels. Again, the possible effects of these objects are at 
the forefront of the argument, not the activity of counterfeiting or compromise, or the 
people engaged in the activity threat. Moreover, the volume of IPV seizures are irrelevant 
given the possible effects; a small quantity could create the effects most concerning to 
policy makers. This description will provide more evidence as to why a need exists to 
understand the root of behavioral dynamics behind actor intentions, instead of objects, 
tactics, or hierarchies.  
Introduction of electronic IPV components (counterfeit or compromised) 
into financial, database, defense or communications systems could create vulnerabilities 
subject to exploitation or system failure. Counterfeit and pirated media (e.g., movies, 
operating systems, applications) also result in economic vulnerabilities, such as loss of 
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profit by companies, and revenue. A 2007 report from The Institute for Policy Innovation, 
for instance, estimated that the U.S. economy experienced a loss of 373,375 jobs, $16.3 
billion in wages, and $2.6 billion in tax revenue, due to piracy in 2005 alone.94  
The potential consequences of IPV components also pose a risk to privacy 
rights (e.g., medical records, identity), public safety,95 state secrets (e.g., operational 
plans, logistical information), and defense infrastructure96 (e.g., navigational systems, 
launch mechanisms).  
The concern of espionage, safety, and economic impact via IPV has led to 
the creation of the National Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Coordination Center, a 
multi-national defense taskforce with 21 participating domestic and international 
organizations.97 This taskforce conducted an operation in fiscal year (FY) 2012, 
Operation Chain Reaction, which focused on goods bound for the Department of 
Defense or other U.S. agency supply chains. The operation resulted in the seizure of 
goods, electronics, currency, and vehicles valued at over $9.83 million.98  
Electronics are as widespread and interdependent as technology itself. 
Economic and defense sub-systems are highly dependent, and have numerous 
interconnected systems that also require electronic parts. In this respect, electronic IPV 
components are of extreme concern. Very little research, however, explores different 
classifications of IPV types with the motivations and ideology of the actors producing or 
distributing them. Also rare is root cause analysis to understand why counterfeits 
continue to grow, even though interdictions are steadily increasing. The effects of the 
94 Stephen E. Siewek, “The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U.S. Economy,” The 
Institute for Policy Innovation, Policy Report 189 (2007): 1, http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_ 
CopyrightPiracy.pdf. 
95 Courtney Robinson, “Counterfeit Electronics-A Dangerous Growing Problem,” www.abc-7.com, 
May 22, 2013, http://www.abc-7.com/story/22401977/counterfeit-electronics-a-dangerous-growing-
problem. 
96 Eric Savitz, “The Serious Risks from Counterfeit Electronic Parts,” Forbes, July 11, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/07/11/the-serious-risks-from-counterfeit-electronic-parts/2/. 
97 Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, “Home,” (n.d.), http://www.iprcenter.gov/. 
98 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2012 Seizure 




                                                 
objects themselves are highlighted as the concern; that is, the justification for 
enforcement. Given the components have to enter the supply chain to enter the legitimate 
market, reports again call for border interdiction, as well as source procurement limits.99 
Avoidance of understanding the dynamics behind why this tool is being used, by whom, 
in what manner, and by what ideology, will result in significant resource outlays and 
arbitrary enforcement.  
Source procurement, gaps in production controls, gaps in identification of 
malicious insiders, and weaknesses in detection capabilities are some exploitable 
vulnerabilities within supply chains.100 Of note, the supply chain is nearly completely 
owed by private companies. Once this chain is breached, however, the costs and burden 
of identifying and interdicting the tangible101 forms of these goods is currently seen as a 
border enforcement objective. As such, execution of this enforcement objective intersects 
directly with the facilitation paradigm. As mentioned in a previous chapter, border 
enforcement results in significant economic costs.  
Due to the interconnected nature of supply chains, trade has increasingly 
become automated to speed port throughput. If shippers are “trusted,” very little hands on 
inspection occurs; a concern given supply chains can be exploited in ways not often 
detected (e.g., insider threat). This policy dynamic limits physical examinations to 
random computer generated compliance checks, and more infrequently, targeted 
selection. Even with these severe constraints on physical examination at the border, illicit 
IPV are being interdicted, albeit primarily from mail and express mail centers (not 
POEs).102 For example, the CBP, the U.S. agency responsible for border security, 
99 Matthew R. Shindell, Todd Kramer, and Stanely H. Salot Jr., “The ‘Ticking Time Bomb’ of 
Counterfeit Electronic Parts,” Industry Week, July 22, 2013, http://www.industryweek.com/procure 
ment/ticking-time-bomb-counterfeit-electronic-parts. 
100 Wenke Lee and Bo Rotoloni, “Emerging Cyber Threats Report 2013,” Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Georgia Tech Cyber Security Summit 2012, Presented by the Georgia Tech Information 
Security Center and the Georgia Tech Research Institute, 4. 
101 It is important to understand that virtual and tangible forms of counterfeit and/or compromised 
software exist; virtual threat form is transmitted across national boundaries via a complex network of fiber 
optic and satellite communications platforms. Importation of virtual threats is not directly managed through 
the supply chain or trade laws enforced within border systems.  
102 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2012 Seizure 
Statistics. 
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reported that of the 27,067 IPV border seizures in FY2012, 15% were consumer 
electronics, a 4% increase from FY2011.103  
As a side note, it is interesting to observe that IPV are not publicly 
associated with the growing cyber threat paradigm. Whereas electronic IPV actors are 
informally understood as guided by a profit-motive, cyber threat actors are seen as having 
many different motivations, including terrorism and espionage.104 Electronic IPV, either 
through counterfeit or compromise, are seen as separate and distinct objects from those of 
objects used in cyber, terrorism, or hostile-state activities. This disconnect is troubling, 
given software objects (viruses, malware, Trojans) are distributed via counterfeit and/or 
legitimate hardware components, via supply chains.  
The border is used as a preventive measure to interdict these IPV objects; 
thus aligning with the protectionist view. Yet, as electronics seizures are increasing at the 
border, it becomes evident that private company supply chains are being more 
fully exploited, even with a plethora of facilitatory “supply chain security” 
initiatives.105 What are the behavioral dynamics around the exploitation process? Is 
IPV a tool that, like drugs and currency, can serve as a vehicle by which many 
shifting motivations can capitalize? If so, the motivations of the actors would be an 
extremely important dynamic to understand. Given limited resources to hand inspect 
all shipments, and the growing agendas for speedy cross-border movement, 
understanding the intentions of actors that use IPV as a tool will be critical to selective 
enforcement.  
103 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2012 Seizure 
Statistics, 18–19. 
104 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Security: Cyber Threats Facilitate Ability to 
Commit Economic Espionage, Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, (June 
28, 2012). http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592008.pdf. 
105 Scott Hudson, “Overview of U.S. Government Security Initiatives,” Poole College of Management 
Supply Chain Resource Cooperative, January 31, 2006, http://scm.ncsu.edu/scm-articles/article/overview-
of-us-government-security-initiatives. 
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C. SUMMARY AND TAKEAWAYS 
To recap briefly, threat management programs draw insight to what are perceived 
as threats: people, activities, and things that may cause unmanageable national effects. 
Due to the assumption that the effects of these threats would be irreparable, a 
protectionist, zero-sum control strategy guides policy. The measurement of the number of 
people and things intercepted is what guides assessment of prevention effectiveness.  
It is important to call attention to the contradictory and inconsistent manner with 
which these are both understood and managed. The implementation and monitoring of 
prevention efforts evolves around the objects used by the threats. By this logic, the more 
tools interdicted, the lower the number of threats, the more secure the border. Prevention 
equals blocking movement of a tool used by a threat. Yet, even this concept continues to 
be debated. CBP seizures have increased significantly from fiscal year 2006 to 2012, yet 
Congress refutes any claim to a securing of the border. Policy makers shift site to people 
as the measure of security, not their tools or tactics.106  
The next chapter presents the border security system as a conceptual model to 
demonstrate the system as a CAS. Threats, feedback loops, stocks, flows, and delays are 
illustrated to reflect interdependencies, rate controls, and behavioral influences.  
106 Brad Plumer, “Border Security Is the Key to Immigration Reform. So How Do We Measure It?,” 
Washington Post WONKBLOG, June 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2013/06/21/border-security-is-the-key-to-immigration-reform-so-how-do-we-define-it/. 
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V. MODELING COMPLEXITY 
And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—
where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and 
sorrow? …Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a 
State is disorganized—when you have one-half of the world triumphing 
and the other plunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or 
the citizens?107  
–Plato 
Since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, managing U.S. borders has taken 
the form of sovereign defense, a force projection capacity, and trade as an income 
generator; an approach that has all but ignored cultural and social interdependencies and 
consequences. From 1783 to the early 20th century, borders were not seen as something 
to secure, as much as something to manage for revenue collection and luring immigrants 
to help settle the continent. Starting in 1924, the institutional vision to securing U.S. 
borders emerged to revolve around limiting immigration: preventing the entry of Chinese, 
anarchists, communists, and bootleggers, as well as political and racially driven agendas 
guised as threats to the “American way of life.” The War on Drugs, free trade 
agreements, War on Terror, and economic uncertainty have led to the metastasis of this 
security vision into a hydra of protective defense from not only people, but all things and 
ideas outside of economic and political controls. This nebulous hydra creates an 
existential, almost cosmic108 view of border security, void of coherent drivers behind the 
behavioral actions taken by law enforcement, immigrants, criminals, and terrorists. This 
existentialism equally applies to that which “defense” is intended to protect, a “way of 
life.” It is no surprise, then, that in the aftermath of 9/11, this vision, protection from 
threats to the hegemony of the United States, exponentially broadened to include 
intelligence collection and paramilitary operations. Throughout the 21st century post-
107 Plato, Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett (1871) (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2004), 166, 
Book 5, section 462. 
108 See Reza Aslan, Beyond Fundamentalism (New York: Random House Trade Paperback, 2010) for 
a detailed discussion regarding the concept of “cosmic war.”  
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industrial world, securing borders has now become synonymous with “national security,” 
“homeland security,” and “global security,” that is, survival.  
In exploring whether U.S. border security is a complex adaptive system (CAS, 
this cosmic view of survival must be considered when contemplating what influences 
behavioral adaptations within the border system. An attempt is made in this chapter to 
demonstrate that the border hydra is reinforced through perceived threats rooted in the 
influence of foreign, social, and economic policies and beliefs, non-linear and non-
enforceable. The effects of these influences upon people create the dynamics that frame 
the border as a CAS, and catalyze adaptive behaviors. 
This chapter introduces the reader to just two common border issues, (1) 
transnational terrorists, and (2) trade. These two issues were chosen based upon their 
many intersections with the existential ideologies of the American way of life, regional, 
national and global economic dependencies, the intersection of defense and protection, 
and the frequently cited importance of these issues in homeland security budget 
justifications. The movement of trade and transnational terrorists will demonstrate well 
enough the complexity of border security, although many more issues affect the border 
system. Modeling of all border issues and dynamics would be untenable within the time 
and space of this research. The global web of trade and terrorism are sufficient to meet 
the objective of this thesis, to demonstrate that border security is a CAS.  
Stock and flow diagrams are used to present the basic elements, activity flows, 
rate controls, and a sampling of feedback loops influencing movement around and 
through borders. Next, these smaller models are correlated with an extended-set of 
second and third tier influences that connect to four larger system elements: 1) 
institutional capabilities and priorities, 2) TCO capabilities, and 3) operational 
capabilities and priorities, and 4) the ability to move people and goods rapidly. The 
chapter ends by presenting the holistic conceptual model associated with these four 
elements, and a sampling of influences that interconnect them. This conceptual model 
provides a visual representation of the interconnected influences that holistically 
contribute to the behavior of the border CAS. The objective of this model is to 
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demonstrate that the border is indeed a CAS and provide illustration why single-issue 
policies, such as deploying technologies along the border, will not lead to secure borders.  
A. COMPLICATED VERSUS COMPLEX 
First, it is important to differentiate between “complicated” and “complex,” as 
each has discrete dynamics and policy implications. Distinct differences occur between 
“complicated” and “complex” that create decision-making implications at both policy and 
operational levels. Characteristics of complicated issues have discoverable and knowable 
causal links from which future behaviors can be predicted (assumption of order), decision 
making based upon maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (rational choice), and 
actions that are the result of deliberate behavior (assumption of intentional capability).109 
Complicated issues are predictable, mechanistic (think procedures), and controllable,110 
and reflect the current approach to managing and securing the border. Immigration laws, 
and the procedures in place to enforce those laws, are an example of complicated issues. 
Alternatively, causal links associated with complex issues can only be known and 
understood in retrospect and do not repeat (randomness), decision making is based upon 
sense-making (not pre-determined choices), and actions are the result of adaptation to 
environmental factors. Complex issues are unpredictable, create patterns at a system-level 
(not agent-level), and oscillate as actions expand and contract the boundaries of a system. 
Complex issues cannot be managed through preventive measures, as the causation and 
actors cannot be determined until an event occurs. The drivers behind why an individual 
decides to engage in illegal immigration, the methods utilized to migrate illegally, and the 
effects of enforcement operations upon local economies and social identities are 
examples of complex issues. Figure 1 illustrates the four domains of the Cynefin 
framework defined by Kurtz and Snowden, describing these differences:  
109 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a Complex and 
Complicated World,” 462–463. 
110 Ibid., 468. 
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Figure 1.  Kurtz and Snowden’s Cynefin Framework111 
The “knowable” and “known” domains correlate with complicated issues, such as 
workflows, transportation networks, and visa application processes. The important 
takeaway from this differentiation is to recognize that border threats (and responses to 
those threats) can oscillate between these domains. These oscillations create the dynamics 
of a CAS. For example, by building nearly 700 miles of fencing along the southwest 
border of the United States, with the objective of stemming illegal migration and drug 
trafficking, apprehensions in select land-based regions (e.g., Tucson and Yuma Arizona) 
has significantly been reduced. On one hand, the “known” issue of surface traffic through 
specific regions was stemmed; however, the fencing has funneled access points through 
the border to remote areas controlled by TCOs. This funneling has bolstered the power of 
TCOs through control of highly coveted access routes, has led to increased cartel 
competition, spill-over violence, increased violence and exploitation against migrants, 
and disruptive innovations, such as the use of semi-submersibles, tunnels, catapults, and 
low-flying aircraft, which further diversifies drug and illegal immigrant entry 
mechanisms. The border issue of transnational terrorists entering into the United States 
further illustrates this idea and is explored next.  
111 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a Complex and 
Complicated World,” 468. 
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B. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS 
Transnational terrorists crossing the border have been at the center of border 
security policies and operational initiatives since 9/11.112 An individual intent on 
committing or supporting a terrorist act would use the same pathways of entry as an 
individual driven by personal objectives, such as family or employment, and criminal 
organizations to transit illicit contraband. Consequently, debates have blurred over the 
entry of terrorists, illegal immigrant entry, and TCO activities.113 This section first 
provides a brief description of means of entry, and then focuses specifically on the flow 
model of foreign terrorists.  
1. Legal Entry 
Entering U.S. sovereign territory can be achieved via both licit and illicit 
methods. A traveler can be a U.S. citizen, U.S. permanent resident, or hold a legitimate 
visa (student, business, tourism, asylum, refugee), to enable entry through licit means at 
POEs. Travelers will not be apprehended at the border, as they would be legitimate 
crossers at the time of entry. The exception to this rule is when the frontline law 
enforcement officer receives actionable intelligence114 at the time of processing, or intent 
to commit a crime is elicited from the traveler at the time of entry. Aside from this 
exception, the individual will enter the United States legally.  
112 Hernan Rozemberg, “9/11 Linked Immigration with Border Security, Anti-Terrorism,” Fronteras, 
September 11, 2011, http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/911-linked-immigration-border-security-anti-
terrorism. 
113 In discussing drug trafficking, illegal immigrants, and terrorism, Andres Becker et al. quoted 
Alonzo Peña, former Deputy Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as having said that 
“After 9/11, the immigrant, terrorist and criminal and the threat to national security have all been lumped 
together,”… “We’re not distinguishing very well who is who.” See the following article for more detail: 
Andres Becker, G. W. Schulz, and Tia Ghose, “Four of Five Border Patrol Drug Busts Involve U.S. 
Citizens,” The Center for Investigative Reporting, March 26, 2013, http://cironline.org/reports/four-five-
border-patrol-drug-busts-involve-us-citizens-records-show-4312. 
114 In this context, “actionable intelligence” refers to information relating to the documentable link to 
the crime of terrorism of the individual traveler that would provide enough evidence for refusal of entry, or 
evidence that could withstand judicial review. Denial of legal entry must be supported by evidence and 
reference a specific section of immigration law for a law enforcement officer to refuse legal entry. If a 
document, travel plans, criminal history, and stated intentions do not violate immigration or criminal law, 
admission into the United States will be approved.  
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2. Illegal Entry 
Illicit entry can be made in four ways: imposter, fraud, stow-away, and between 
POEs. The first three are executed through POEs, and are the domain of the CBP, Office 
of Field Operations. The fourth is the only domain of the CBP Office of Border Patrol 
(the headquarters of the U.S. Border Patrol).  
An imposter applies for entry to the United States through a POE while assuming 
someone else’s identity.115 Fraudulent means of entry include a person who attempts 
entry through a POE with counterfeit documents,116 legitimate documents that have been 
altered, or legitimate documents obtained from U.S. Consulates (Department of State) 
through deceit.117 A stow-away crosses through a POE while hiding within legitimate 
cargo, in structural voids of transportation vehicles, or in manufactured compartments. 
The last category, people who attempt entry between POEs, such as via tunnels, kayaks, 
foot, or gliders, dominates the border security debate. Apprehension rates of people 
within this fourth category is most often used to measure security performance and 
influence appropriation decisions by policy makers, although research suggests a shifting 
concern towards the use of fraudulent entry through POEs, in the form of refugees.118 If 
border security were about illegal immigration, all four forms of illicit entry would be 
equally addressed. This concept is but an example of the limited understanding of border 
security in the public domain.  
115 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “HIS Arrests 20 Cuban Imposters Seeking 
Immigration Benefits,” News Release, April 17, 2013, 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1304/130417miami.htm. 
116 Examples include visas, passports, birth certificates, trusted traveler and border crossing cards. 
117 An example of deceit includes someone attempting entry with a legitimate and validated student 
visa, with the traveler’s true identity, which would be fraudulent if the traveler did not in fact intend to 
attend school, but registered only as a means to acquire the visa and make entry. The researcher 
incorporates those who overstay a visa within this category.  
118 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Subcommittee Hearing: Terrorist Exploitation of 
Refugee Programs,” Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,” Washington, DC, December 4, 
2012, 10:00 a.m., http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-terrorist-exploitation-refugee-
programs; C-SPAN, “House Cmte. Examines Terrorist Abuse of Refugee Programs,” Washington, DC, 
December 4, 2012, http://www.c-span.org/Events/House-Cmte-Examines-Terrorist-Abuse-of-Refugee-
Programs/10737436276–1/. 
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3. Identity and Radicalization 
Since 9/11, “terrorists” are often assumed to be violent Islamists, originating from 
a foreign source, and driven by an intent to target foreign governments and the civilian 
populations of their espoused “far enemy.”119 This association has propelled border 
security into a global security domain.  
These violent Islamists often become radicalized as a result of what are perceived 
to be threats to variable religious, cultural, economic, and sociopolitical beliefs, identity 
and ideologically based factors.120 Research indicates that globalization is contributing to 
these factors, at the individual and group level, and vary in depth and degree by cultural 
context.121,122  
4. Globalization 
Globalization is a key influence upon the identities of Muslims, among others.123 
As the current “leader of the free world,” the United States guides this policy, and 
engages in expansion and market growth initiatives needed to bolster it. Expansion and 
growth require presence and influence upon foreign governments, societies, and cultures, 
which in turn creates financial and trade dependencies between nations. These economic 
initiatives and foreign policy influences have resulted in negative cultural, religious, and 
socioeconomic threats to identities, including resurgence in racism, which in turn, 
marginalizes select individuals and groups.124 This marginalization further increases 
119 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 61–64; Sageman discusses the history and definition of Muslim terrorists, which he refers to 
as the “global Salafi mujahedin,” the dominant terrorist threat faced by the West.  
120 Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), 205. 
121 Henri Tajfel. ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, European Studies in Social Psychology 
(Cambridge, CB2 8RU: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 161. 
122 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, 2008), 100. 
123 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, 
Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 
2010), Kindle edition, Loc 943–1013 of 2468. 
124 Charles O. Lerche III, “The Conflicts of Globalization,” The International Journal of Peace 
Studies 3, no.1 (January 1998), http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/learch.htm. 
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vulnerabilities to the radicalization process.125 It is through globalization that U.S. 
borders are “extended,” and corporate influences blur the concept of sovereign borders. 
In this respect, the manner in which globalization policies are implemented poses a threat 
to border security by creating grievances against the United States within vulnerable 
populations, who are then prone to radicalization.  
5. Foreign Terrorist Stock and Logistical Support 
Once radicalized, a person enters the stock of “foreign terrorist.” When an 
objective is established to commit a terrorist act, planning and movement commences to 
align resources; in the case of the border, this means making arrangements to obtain 
access to U.S. targets. A key rate control of this process is logistical support.126 The costs 
of terrorist financing, havens for training, propaganda, and numerous support networks 
for travel, documents, and safe houses are necessary for movement along the approach 
flow. Logistical support, in this context, is a threat to border security in that it enables 
undetected mobilization of terrorists towards U.S. territory.  
6. Border Stock and Apprehensions 
The stock of “border” is increased when the terrorist reaches the geo-political 
borderline (or perimeters of embassies, military bases, or other U.S. properties) and entry 
is attempted, either through licit or illicit means as earlier described. As the border stock 
raises, the flow of entry increases, controlled only by apprehension rates of illegal entry. 
As earlier noted, it is in the narrow view of illicit entry between POEs that currently 
frame most border security policy and resource decisions, one of four illegal means. 
When apprehension is averted, either by using legitimate entry mechanisms or by evasion 
of detection, the foreign terrorist enters the United States At this stage, the foreign  
 
125 Maajid Nawaz, Radical: My Journey out of Islamist Extremism (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2013), 
42–43. 
126 Sue Mahan and Pamala L. Griset, Terrorism in Perspective, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2008), 117–118; the authors discussed the value of propaganda, logistical, and auxiliary 
support of al Qaeda. In this chapter, “logistical” is intended to encapsulate all three.  
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terrorist has achieved harbor127 on U.S. soil, and border security policies become 
ineffectual. Any policy decisions beyond this point fall within the parameters of the 
domestic domain.  
7. Terrorist In-Residence Stock and Logistical Support 
A terrorist in residence is free to conduct target surveillance, engage in domestic 
recruitment, and employ activities to sustain motivation. Upon activation,128 the terrorist 
enters the process of “staging.” Staging, in this context, includes acquisition of resources 
to commit an act of violence, positioning of those resources, and preparation of 
participants for engagement. The key rate control of staging is again logistical support. 
Financial, spiritual, resource, housing, counter surveillance, assimilation guidance,129 and 
communications capabilities enable movement along the staging flow. Just as with the 
process of approaching the border, logistical support for terrorists once they are within 
the domestic domain, is a threat. When this flow is successfully navigated, the stock of 
“terrorist act” has the likelihood of increasing; in other words, the probability rises that 
more acts of violence could occur.  
8. Terrorist Act Stock and In-Group Inspiration 
The methods of violence within the “terrorist act” stock widely vary. Suicide 
bombers, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), hijacking, mass 
shootings, sabotage of power grid components, and chemical attacks to name a few. This 
stock is the realm of emergency and crisis management. The higher the casualties the act 
creates, the larger the media coverage of the event, and the more extreme the government 
response to the consequences, the more likely the act will influence the acceptance and 
inspiration of the ideological “in-group” abroad. The humiliation of government, a 
plausible effect caused by a terrorist act, bolsters motivation and enthusiasm of 
vulnerable people facing disenfranchisement, which increases the likelihood of further 
127 “Harbor” in this context refers both to logistical support networks and constitutional rights. 
128 “Activation” in this context refers to a catalyst to act, be it an order from a superior, or a personal 
decision to begin preparations for engagement. 
129 “Assimilation guidance” refers to blending into the community, avoiding detection domestically, 
and sustainment of a cover identity, such as employment, marriage, and school.  
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radicalization, and thus, reinforces the entire cycle.130 In this sense, heavy-handed 
government response, media coverage, and the lack of civic resilience are threats to 
border security.  
Beyond the cycle reinforcement effect, the “terrorist act” stock was included in 
the border security sub-model to capture another dynamic that occurs within the border 
security system. Domestic terror attacks, when found to be perpetrated by foreign-born 
persons, will unleash extended debates regarding both immigration reform and border 
security, irrespective of how that person made entry into the United States, or what the 
perpetrator’s citizenship status was at the time of the attack. This factor has roots in the 
history of U.S. borders and immigration controls elucidated in Chapter III; foreigners 
being seen as threats. Figure 2 represents the sub-model of the transnational terrorist 
movement process described previously. 
 
Figure 2.  Stock and Flow of Transnational Terrorist Entry into the United States131 
130 Mahan and Griset, Terrorism in Perspective, 29; Mahan and Griset refer to this inspirational effect 
as an “excitational function;” that is, a catalyst to inspire further resistance nourished through propaganda. 
131 Stock and flow diagrams provide a technique to distinguish parts of a system visually, associate 
their relationship to one another, identify what makes them change, and provides a foundation by which 
mathematical factors can be formulated to simulate behaviors. Rate control ( ) is a factor that increases or 
decreases the volume of information, goods, or people moving into or out of a stock. A flow ( ) 
represents movement of information, goods, or people. The boundary of a system is represented by a cloud 
( ).  
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It should be noted that this model is a finite, incomplete representation of growth 
and movement of terrorists to and through borders. Terrorism, the border, and 
connections between each stock and flow are more fluid, interactive, and adaptive than 
this model can display. Additionally, the boundary is set at the point when radicalization 
begins, which places the dynamics that lead up to radicalization out of scope. This model 
does not infer a complete framing of the complexities surrounding the creation of, or 
movement by, terrorists entering the United States. 
9. The Weakness of Apprehension Measures 
Protection against the entry of the terrorist “threat” currently pivots around 
apprehension rates,132 although this measure is increasingly being questioned.133 Despite 
former Secretary Napolitano’s claim of substantial gains in border enforcement, 
apprehension rates have not lead to acuity of secure borders.134,135 Resistance to 
accepting apprehension rates as an indicator of border security suggests at least an 
informal acknowledgement that other dynamics are at play. For example, a lower 
apprehension rate may indicate that fewer people are attempting to enter the United 
States, but it may also suggest tactics are evolving beyond the need to make entry (e.g., 
web-based employment), new methods of illicit entry are being used, economic or social 
factors have changed that have lessened the ability or desire to make illicit entry, or 
people have already entered the country. Alternatively, a spike in apprehension rates may 
indicate more effective enforcement operations, but it may also suggest growth in 
capacity of existing networks to saturate the border domain, or it could be that economic 
or safety factors have changed that have shifted the willingness to accept more risk to 
132 Apprehension rates associate with the movement of people. Interdiction rates are also used as a 
pivot, but are specific to movement of “goods.” This discussion is only looking at the people categorized as 
“terrorists,” and not any “thing” that they may be carrying or transporting.  
133 Chad C. Haddal, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, CRS Report RL32562 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 30, 2010), 11.  
134 Seth McLaughlin, “Napolitano Says Border Is Secure, Though Proof Is Lacking No Clear Measure 
Could Scuttle Immigration,” Washington Times, March 3, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2013/mar/26/napolitano-says-border-is-secure-though-proof-is-l/?page=all. 
135 Marty Graham, “Napolitano Touts U.S. Border Security Gains Despite More Arrests,” Reuters, 
February 5, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-usa-napolitano-border-idUSBRE9140A 
F20130205. 
 67 
                                                 
cross (e.g., criminal violence in the border regions). A comprehensive study of 
apprehensions and associated dynamics is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, the 
concept of associated dynamics themselves contributes to the border CAS.  
Border policies measured by apprehensions reflect a narrow, control-centric 
vision, rather than a holistic vision of identifying and understanding leverage points to 
counter-influence the economic, political, cultural, and social subtleties contributing to 
movement of future terrorists.136 Irrespective of what apprehension rates are seen to 
represent, the quantitative measure fails to lend insight into the root dynamics driving the 
decisions people make to migrate.  
Very much like those of illegal immigration enforcement strategies, current 
security strategies pertaining to terrorist flows focus on logistics, support, and 
apprehension rates as the targets for assessing security. Dismantling support networks, 
freezing financial assets, apprehending terrorists at the border, and conducting domestic 
surveillance to detect terrorists in-residence, are the current measures for managing this 
stock and flow process. Missing from these strategies are coherence of extended 
influences beyond the linear flow model, and consideration of leveraging the policies that 
are driving the radicalization process to begin with. One small set of extended influences 
affecting the rate of radicalization is proposed next.  
10. Correlation: Institutional and Operational Capacities and Priorities  
The behavioral influences upon a specific stock and flow extend well beyond 
direct rate controls. The inability of institutions (government) to provide for the basic 
needs of a population, such as jobs, education, legal recourse, or a forum for organized 
public dissent, for example, create a cadre of disaffected people ripe for radicalization.137 
Inadequate public or social services, levels of violence, and the ineffectiveness of 
government institutions create vulnerabilities within the civilian populations that criminal 
136 Becker, Schulz, and Ghose, “Four of Five Border Patrol Drug Busts Involve U.S. Citizens.”  
137 Paul Shemella, ed., Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 182. 
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organizations can exploit for legitimization.138 By way of example, a broader look at the 
influence of sanctions upon identities and cultural context is described next.  
a. Cultural Context and Identity 
Cultures form through individual and group identities that then create a 
filter by which policies are interpreted as just or unjust.139 National, organizational, 
racial, partisan, and social values, each with distinct characteristics and behavioral 
influences upon identity reflect some of these filters. Intractable conflicts often arise from 
the belief of the “rightness” of one culture over another (media, political, social, and 
cultural bias), heavily influenced by individual and group identities, and what are seen as 
threats to those identities. 140 The power of one group over another, and the sense of a 
loss or weakening of distinctiveness, drives much of the violent conflict, and taints the 
response to policies. The discernment that an individual or group is losing distinctiveness 
thus increases vulnerability to radicalization.  
b. Institutional Capacity, Basic Needs, Sanctions, and Identity 
Imposing economic and trade sanctions upon another nation will severely 
limit the ability of a government to acquire the revenue and goods necessary to provide 
basic social and economic needs of their population.141 Sanctions upon Iraq during the 
1990s, for instance, are estimated to have resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
due to food and medical shortages, and failure of power and sanitation infrastructures 
138 Riley and Kiernan, eds., “The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A 
Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Security,” 34. 
139 Simon Clarke, “Culture and Identity,” The Sage Handbook of Cultural Analysis, 2008, August 8, 
2011, 510–529, http://www.sagepub.com/healeyregc6e/study/chapter/encycarticles/ch01/CLARKE~1.PDF, 
140 Louis Kriesberg, “Identity Issues,” Beyond Intractability, edited by Guy Burgess and Heidi 
Burgess, Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, July 2003, http://www.beyond 
intractability.org/essay/identity-issues. 
141 Mina Khanlarzadeh, “The Effects of the Economic Sanctions Against Iran,” Jadaliyya, July 26, 
2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13200/the-effects-of-the-economic-sanctions-against-iran. 
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without supplies to make repairs.142 Although the United States sees this tool (sanctions) 
as an effective measure to influence the target nation to comply with external values, the 
ripple effects of this policy can worsen radicalization trends. The less revenue and trade 
capacity a nation possesses, the less stable the social population, the higher the likelihood 
of violence, crime, and ideological polarization. The failure of a government to sustain a 
healthy economy that provides employment, education, and social mobility to its citizens, 
leads to national instability. Imposing economic and trade constraints can create an 
environment wherein basic “human psychological universals” and the need for a 
“minimum level of control” are denied, which can be seen to threaten collective 
survival,143 and further escalates vulnerabilities towards radicalization. If the population 
perceives the cause of their government’s failure as U.S.-imposed sanctions, grievances 
of the population shift away from their own government and towards the United States. It 
is from this effect that sanctions could be understood as a threat to border security. See 
Figure 3. 
142 John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 1999, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55009/john-mueller-and-karl-mueller/sanctions-of-mass-
destruction; Estimates include an increase in infant mortality from 3.7 to 12%; 40,000 more deaths per year 
of children, and 50,000 more deaths per year of older Iraqis as a result of severe economic and trade 
sanctions. 
143 Fathali M. Moghaddam, How Globalization Spurs Terrorism: The Lopsided Benefits of “One 
World” and Why That Fuels Violence (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), Kindle edition, 
Loc 1414–1442 of 2468. 
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Figure 3.  Systemic Influences Effecting Rate of Radicalization Through Threat to 
Identity144 
c. Operational Capacity and Priorities, and Public Support 
An operator’s145 coherence of social and cultural dynamics influences the 
choice of policy to fit a particular region, and whether the populations within that region 
support the policy (or authority), or reject it as illegitimate.146 The level of resources 
expended towards an operational policy, and how balanced that policy appears to be 
(hard versus soft) as seen from a cultural context, also contributes to whether the public 
144 The information flows display either positive (+) or negative (-) relationships. A positive (+) 
indicates an increase in the level of influence. For example, an increase in the value of culture will lead to 
an increase in the levels of perceived identity loss. The opposite holds true for negative (-) influences. For 
example, a decrease in the capabilities of institutions leads to a reduction in meeting the basic needs of their 
populations.  
145 The term ‘ operator’ refers to diplomats, elected officials, law enforcement, and the military. 
146 Robert Beljan, “Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from an ISAF Perspective,” Small Wars Journal, 
May 30, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghanistan-lessons-learned-from-an-isaf-perspective. 
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tolerates the effort.147 A lack of social and cultural awareness contributes to ill-fitting 
policy choices, and are in turn likely to be seen as a threat to the affected population. The 
perception of a policy as imbalanced and unfair, combined with the inability of a 
government to provide basic needs as a result (such as with a sanction), will further 
polarize and challenge national and other social identities. It is in this context that ill-
fitting, imbalanced operational policies, which do not reflect social and cultural 
awareness, are threats to border security, as they can contribute to increased rates of 
radicalization, and by extension, the stock of foreign terrorists intent on entering U.S. 
territory.  
Issues, such as economic policies, culture, identity, and institutional 
capacity, interface to create the threat of a person entering the United States to commit a 
violent act. Probing and adjusting the policies serving to drive the growth in 
radicalization are the leverage points. When it comes to border security programs, 
however, resources continue to be disproportionately concentrated at the geo-political 
border, as a form of deterrence and projection of an “image of authority and power.”148 
This strategy, when seen from the global perspective as just described, reinforces 
radicalization. See Figure 4. 
 
147 U.S. Department of State, “Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview,” 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, May 30, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209983.htm; Report notes under “Kazakhstan” that “critics claimed 
that official measures to counter radicalization and violent extremism were often too heavy-handed and 
could result in increasing radicalization. 
148 Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” 
International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 109–110, http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political 
_Science/documents/Redrawing_the_Line.pdf. 
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Figure 4.  Correlation between Operational and Institutional capacity and identity 
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The failure to comprehend holistic systemic behavioral indicators that lend 
insight to alternative, and more cost-effective strategies, constrain the vision of border 
security to a mechanism for surveillance and detection technology, growth of staffing for 
reactive capacity, and control approaches between POEs. Insofar as terrorist entry, the 
vulnerability to border security is radicalization and identity dynamics catalyzed by U.S. 
policies, not what is often phrased as “porous borders.” Next, globalized trade, another 
process that contributes to increased rates of radicalization and criminal activities, yet is 
most often framed as border management instead of security, is explored.  
C. TRADE 
As detailed in Chapter III, trade of services and goods across borders has, and 
continues to be, the basis of economic, national, and global power. The expansion of 
trade, consumption, and resource acquisition to further grow foreign power and influence, 
are the drivers of globalization, and contribute to protracted “resource wars.”150 Not 
surprisingly, trade facilitation across borders is critical to the sustainment of globalization 
and power politics. The interdependencies throughout cross-border trade contribute to 
border CAS dynamics. By way of a simplified introduction, the flow of foreign 
production, foreign export, domestic import, and finally, movement through the domestic 
market to corporate profit, will describe one facet of these interdependencies.  
1. Resources and Production 
The border serves as a corridor through which U.S. and foreign manufactured 
goods and finance are exchanged. Resource acquisition (land, labor, knowledge, capital, 
enterprise) is the key rate control of production,151 growth and reduction of which create 
oscillations throughout trade, environmental, social, and cultural systems. Insofar as 
trade, the lower the reserve of raw materials, skills, and land, the slower the rate of 
production. It stands to reason that increased access to these resources result in increased 
production.  
150 Philippe Le Billon, “The Geopolitical Economy of ‘Resource Wars,’” Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (March 
2004): 1–28. http://www.neiu.edu/~dgrammen/2004LEBILLON.pdf. 
151 Business Dictionary.com, “Factors of Production,” (n.d), http://www.businessdictionary.com/ 
definition/factors-of-production.html. 
 74 
                                                 
2. Foreign Supply Chain Stock and Trade Agreements 
Increased flows of production create a larger stock of “foreign supply chain.” 
Supply chain in this context refers to the corporate and public infrastructure needed to 
develop, build, market, transport, and sell a commodity. These chains are ecosystems of 
transportation systems, labor markets, shipper and distribution networks, real estate and 
manufacturing bases, as well as regulations, tax, tariff, patent, and wage laws. Trade 
agreements between nations facilitate the transference of commodities that exude through 
these chains, via import and export flows.152 The more mutually conciliatory the 
agreements are (lower tariff rates, standardized rules, reduction of regulatory constraints) 
the faster (less physical inspection) and more robust (volume and special interest) the 
flow to and through the border.153  
3. Border Stock and Compliance Rates 
To move rapidly through the border, shippers must comply with specific 
transport, marking, safety, and fee structures.154 The more compliant the shipper, the 
more quickly commodities transit through the border corridor and enter into and out of 
the domestic supply chain. Compliance rates can be misleading, however, in that the 
framework to inform compliance is significantly constrained by volume of import and 
export flows. Trade volume has expanded to such a degree that physical, human 
inspection of every shipment is untenable.155,156 The mechanics of determining 
152 Executive Office of the President of the United States, “Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP),” Office of the United States Trade Representative, November 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement. 
153 Nakatomi Michitaka, “Improving Global Supply Chains by an Issues-Based Plurilateral 
Approach,” Concept Paper for an International Supply Chain Agreement (ISCA), Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, October 29, 2012, 
http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Event/Sympo/pdf/2013wto_nakatomi01.pdf. 
154 Vivian C. Jones and Marc R. Rosenblum, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, 
Enforcement, and Security, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report R43014 (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 22, 2013), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43014.pdf. 
155 Food & Water Watch, “Import Alert: Government Fails Consumers, Falls Short on Seafood 
Inspections,” July 2007, http://www.safeharborfoods.com/fish-mercury-resources/Food-WaterWatch-
ImportAlert7–07.pdf. 
156 Stephen E. Flynn, “Port Security Is Still a House of Cards,” Center for National Policy, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, January/February 2006, 
http://cnponline.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/16643/pid/. 
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compliance with regulatory structures is a complicated framework, but the effect of 
volume, multilateral agreements, and political influence upon when, where, and how to 
employ those mechanics create complexity.  
The dynamics placed upon verifying compliance, while concurrently being held 
to a standard of rapid transit, continues to baffle border management. Mechanistic 
solutions are continually applied in an effort to address what are in reality complex 
systems that cannot be addressed through procedural improvements. To establish 
compliance, automated manifests and technological exams are rapidly reviewed, in lieu 
of physical examination; the focus continues to be a timestamp, guised as secure if the 
commodity moves through a machine. Automated manifests, radiation port monitors, 
sensors, x-rays, and sniffers, for example, replace physical exams. In theory, if 
documented names, descriptions and codes, shapes, and densities, align with 
requirements and manifests, they are deemed compliant, and a shipment will make entry 
without further need of inspection.  
4. Domestic Supply Chain Stock and Market Rates 
A good that enters the United States must have a demand by which it will transit 
through the domestic market. The key rate control of the domestic market is reflected in 
this model as the “market rate,” applied in this thesis to represent the quantity of supply 
in relation to consumer demand for the commodity. Many dynamics occur within the 
subject of economics and marketing that affect supply and demand, which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The key point is to recognize that without demand, a producer, 
shipper, and distributor do not have an incentive to move a good to or within a consumer 
market, let alone through border corridors. This process within the trade model applies 
equally to both licit and illicit goods.  
5. Corporate Profit Stock, Taxes, and Employment Costs 
The rhetoric in support of increasing trade flows is that the profit acquired by 
corporations will lead to reinvestment, national economic growth, and job creation.157 




                                                 
Again, many political and economic dynamics influence the reality of these claims,158 
but this model will employ the assumption that growth in cross-border trade will indeed 
lead to reinvestment.  
The more robust the market rate, the more corporate (or criminal) profit stocks 
grow. As profit grows, corporations (or criminal organizations) bolster capital stock, 
which in turn, is moderated by tax rates (or criminal bribes/pay-outs). Profit can also be 
used towards job creation (or criminal network building), as production and exchange 
expand. The rate by which jobs are created are moderated by what is called “employment 
costs” in this thesis, such as education, training, minimum wage, and benefit 
requirements (or criminal risk of capture or competitive organizations). Figure 5 
represents the sub-model of the trade process described above. 
 
Figure 5.  Stock-and Flow Diagram of Trade into the United States 
The driver behind foreign production, the start of this flow, is globalization. In 
other words, the continued expansion of trade, resource acquisition, military influence, 
158 Mark Gongloff, “So Much Corporate Cash, So Little Use: Seven and a Half Things to Know,” The 
Huffington Post, March 8, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/08/seven-and-a-half-things-you-
need-to-know_n_2833227.html. 
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economic and political interdependency, and expansion of boundaries.159 The theories 
and dynamics of globalization and economic behaviors are beyond the scope of this 
model, but are essential to understanding the behavior of the holistic border security 
system and need to be modeled before a computational model of the border CAS can be 
built and tested. Determining how to model these in any reliable way will be a substantial 
challenge.  
6. Trade Facilitation Takes Priority Over Security at the Border 
As globalization drives the trade flow forward, the more critical production, 
supply chains, and imports and exports, become the facilitation of which is threatened by 
physical inspection protection measures employed to identify and interdict illegal, and 
categorically prohibited goods, through POEs. These measures become a threat to 
business, in the minds of some policy makers, and thus, catalyze policies that replace 
physical inspection with scanning technologies, and the merging of bi-lateral 
enforcement agencies,160 which further blurs border definitions. Numerous audit reports 
demonstrate this trend, where in one breath it is acknowledged that CBP’s priority is to 
stop criminals and terrorists from entering the United States, only to immediately focus 
on failures of facilitation at POEs.161 It is the latter administrative measure by which POE 
operations are critiqued by policy makers.162 Whereas between POE operations are 
evaluated by apprehensions, timekeepers assess POE operations. The former is based on 
a security posture, the latter, industry and multilateral economics.  
The border trade model as reflected in this thesis creates three national security 
vulnerabilities: lower revenue production (trade agreements reduce tariff and duty 
159 Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for 
Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 743, 
http://identities.org.ru/readings/Religion_globalsiation_and 
.pdf. 
160 John Engler and John Manley, “Strengthening Cross-Border Trade With Canada,” The Hill, blog, 
January 21, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/278327-strengthening-cross-
border-trade-with-canada. 
161 One of many examples: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: CBP Lacks the 
Data Needed to Assess the FAST Program at U.S. Northern Border Ports, (2010). 
162 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S.-Mexico Border: CBP Action Needed to Improve 
Wait Time Data and Measure Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Efforts, (2013), 1–2.  
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collection), increased dependency upon foreign resources (interdependent supply chains), 
and reduced inspectional capacity (law and safety), due to volume and facilitatory 
policies (quantity prioritized over quality). Complex issues, such as international trade 
policies, limited resources, market fluctuations, and employment, interface with the threat 
of a commodity entering the United States without inspection, revenue production, or 
verifiable regulatory compliance. Facilitation measures reinforce a narrow field of vision 
that focuses on complicated, mechanistic processes, such as facility design, automated 
manifesting, and traffic flows; not complex adaptive social systems. The vision of 
retrofitting complicated processes to enhance border throughput (i.e., facilitation) fails to 
recognize the wider security implications of such efforts. 
7. Correlation: Ability to Move People and Goods Rapidly and TCO 
Capacity and Priorities 
The foreign terrorist model described previously was presented in an iterative 
manner by walking the reader through a series of images, each building upon the other. 
This approach was taken to ease the reader into comprehending the complexity of the 
model, and volume of influences. Now that the reader is familiar with model components, 
and should be more comfortable interpreting the diagrams, the trade model correlations 
that follow are provided at once, in a single image.  
The political drivers, expanding and contracting boundaries of supply and 
demand, and the influence of trade, create numerous social and economic “push and pull” 
dynamics163 through and around borders. The U.S. economy is structured around 
continued growth and expansion into foreign markets, which contributes to the growth of 
radicalization as earlier described. Facilitation of trade, when explored at a systems level, 
reinforces many of the same social and economic challenges described in the terrorist 
sub-model, and consequently also influences drug and crime levels.  
163 For a discussion of push and pull, from a public health perspective, associated with deterioration of 
social and environmental factors created by globalization see Corinne Packer, Ronald Labonté, and Vivien 
Runnels, “Globalization and the Cross-Border Flow of Health Workers,” in Globalization and Health: 
Pathways, Evidence and Policy, Chapter nine, ed. R. Labonte, T. Schrecker, C. Packer, and V. Runnels 




                                                 
a. Trade Agreements and the Ability to Move People and Goods
Rapidly
Trade agreements have a direct influence onto the ability to move people 
and goods rapidly through borders. Agreements are negotiated under the auspices of 
doing just that, by incentivizing foreign investment and production, and reforming import 
and export processes. Border facilitation is structured around these agreements, 
as evidenced by the emergence of facilitatory programs, such as Free and Secure 
Trade (FAST),164 and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)165 
were developed with the participation of corporations.166 The impact of trade 
agreements extends well beyond the speed of goods exchange, however.  
Trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), are tools of globalization and foreign policy. Trade and regulatory 
tribunals are formed, and non-state, corporate and special interest-led entities empowered 
to review and impose economic sanction-like penalties onto government regulations or 
laws seen as unfavorable to corporations.167,168 The political, social, cultural and moral 
164 Canada Border Services Agency, “Free and Secure Trade Program Factsheet,” (n.d.), 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/facts-faits/027-eng.html. 
165 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “C-TPAT: Program Overview,” (n.d.), 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ctpat_program_information/what_is_ctpat/
ctpat_overview.ctt/ctpat_overview.pdf. 
166 See Office of Inspector General, “Free and Secure Trade Program-Continued Driver Eligibility,” 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Report OIG-12–84, May 2012, 
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG 
_12–84_May12.pdf for one example of how immigration (i.e., driver eligibility) and safety issues are 
juxtaposed against facilitation.  
167 Francesca Rheannon, “Red Light On Green: How International Trade Tribunals Threaten 
Sustainability and Green Business,” Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire, June 13, 2013, 
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/ 
886-red-light-on-green-how-international-trade-tribunals-threaten-sustainability-and-green-business. 
168 Public Citizen, Eyes on Trade-Blog on Globalization and Trade, “Corporations Now Using 




policy implications of trade agreements (and consequentially resource rates) negatively 
influence identities and perceptions of the fairness of policies.169  
b. Perceptions of Fairness, Basic Needs, and Drug Crime Levels  
When a segment of a population is stripped of basic needs and rights, 
policies are seen as unfair or unjust, and identities are threatened, they are more likely to 
migrate in search of opportunities, or join organizations (e.g., MS-13, FARC) seen as 
their only option to survival. If poor or marginalized, these effected populations are more 
vulnerable to entering into drug use and crime to meet their needs, absent legitimate 
employment options or capacity to migrate safely and legally. Once in the drug and crime 
scene, they are more likely to be recruited by TCOs.  
Insofar as trade flow, these affected populations will be faced at some 
point, with a choice between engaging in legitimate or illicit cross-border activities. Each 
person is faced with a cost benefit analysis, to include acquiring the means to meet basic 
needs, empowerment, and level of risk acceptance (including arrest, injury, or threat of 
death by TCOs). The result of said analysis will directly affect a fraction of the workforce 
engaged in trade. A corrupted workforce then affects legitimate trade, by using 
transportation networks to ship prohibited goods or people through borders, which 
thereby, undermines the efficacy of facilitation programs.  
As levels of cross-border illicit trafficking through trade corridors increase, 
desired security levels also increase, which leads to increased control measures. After a 
short delay, the cost of those control measures (political, economic, social) lead to a 
reduction in control measures. In this context, public, corporate, and foreign government 
acceptance levels of control methods influence whether a benefit to the measure occurs. 
This dynamic occurs regardless of threat category, be it terrorist, criminal, or illegal 
immigrant, as was most clearly witnessed in the first couple of weeks following 9/11, 
with the economic and employment fall-outs due to 100% inspections of cargo. In a less 
dramatic scenario, following the congressional requirement for 100% sea container 
169 Stan Sorscher, “Trade Agreements Reveal How Life Will Be Organized in 2050,” Huffington Post-
The Blog, October 30, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stan-sorscher/trade-agreements-reveal-how-
life_b_4090014.html. 
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inspection, this “perceived benefit/ acceptable cost/ desired security level” reinforcing 
feedback loop continues to constrain CBP from implementing the requirement fully at 





Figure 6.  Expanded Trade Flow Influences.  
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The influence of trade agreements and corporate power on policy decisions to 
employ faciliatory policies over security, are reflective of highly interdependent 
economic interfaces at borders. The effects upon basic population needs being met, 
employment options, and social identity dynamics, reflect the highly complex 
interconnections of foreign policy, trade, social welfare, and crime. The as-is approach of 
border security to balance these issues is to apply mechanistic, technology-based 
applications. The threat, a highly interfaced network of social, moral, political, cultural, 
and economic factors driving crime, will not be prevented, nor will the United States be 
protected, through employment of “known and unknown” protocols, like FAST.  
8. Putting the Pieces Together: The Conceptual Model  
Culture, identity, adversarial adaptation, enforcement, and moral values influence, 
and are all influenced by perceptions of what is seen to be a threat. Through the two sub-
models described in this chapter, “transnational terrorist” and “trade,” four policy-centric, 
external pillars that affect border security become evident: 1) institutional capacity and 
priorities, 2) criminal capacity and priorities, 3) the ability to move people and goods 
across borders rapidly, and 4) operational capacity and priorities.  
The border is the frontier landscape of globalization. It is at once a region, 
corridor, node, and frontier within which a merger of “us” and “them” is occurring: 
domestic and foreign, rich and poor, secular and religious, individual and collective, 
social and political, moral and amoral. Single-issue policies, such as the southern border 
fence and immigration reform, are evidence of an incoherence of this complexity. 
Globalization in its current form has blurred the efficacy and coherence of geo-
political borders. The borders, from an institutional perspective, have become an all but 
declared proxy war zone that must be defended at any cost, from value-based threats. 
Yet, as evidenced by trade and economic policies, this defense becomes a hindrance to 
facilitation. The protectionist vision has created a border security industry grounded on 
force, surveillance, suspicion and restriction. Simultaneously, economic and foreign 
interdependencies bolstering globalization require borders to be fluid, and policies 
associated with them faciliatory. As nations continue to expand economic and resource 
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interdependencies in the name of growth, the systems of social welfare, identity, 
employment, criminal enterprises, and corporate interests, also become interdependent 
and evolve.170 As the border security complex continues to struggle with bridging 
“security” with “facilitation and growth,” social groups throughout the world, in turn, 
struggle with the effects these issues place upon their safety and identity. Understanding 
the border as a CAS is one step towards understanding the consequences of these 
struggles, and towards better informing border security policy decisions.  
The next page presents the larger conceptual CAS model of border security (see 
Figure 7). The stock and flows are not displayed, and can be thought of as layered 
beneath the image. Many, perhaps hundreds, of stock and flows pertain to these 
dynamics. In an effort to assist the reader in interpreting the model, approach it as a quad 
chart, although it should be understood that the pillars are not distinct from each other, or 
reducible components. The systems evolve due to oscillations in any one of the other 
systems, or combination thereof. The institutional capacity pillar, and influences 
surrounding that system, is located in the upper left quadrant of the model, and can also 
be found in Appendix B. The TCO capacity pillar is located in the upper right quadrant, 
and in Appendix C. The operational capacity pillar is in the lower left quadrant 
(Appendix D), and the ability to move people and goods rapidly in the lower right 
(Appendix E). 
170 See Jane Kelsey and Lori Wallack’s paper “Investor-State” Disputes in Trade Pacts Threaten 
Fundamental Principles of National Judicial Systems,” School of Law, The University of Auckland, New 
Zealand and Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch Division, Washington, DC, April 2012. For a discussion 
on how trade agreements can be seen to threaten rule of law, constitutional powers, environmental 
regulations, and civil rights, http://tpplegal.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/isds-domestic-legal-process-
background-brief.pdf. 
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Figure 7.  Conceptual Model of Border Security 
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9. With Influence Comes Leverage; with Dynamics, Insight 
Not recognizing the border as a CAS, devoid of predictability and control, will 
constrain decision-makers’ ability and capacity to achieve coherent situational awareness. 
Single-issue policies will continue to plague public discourse, and will lead to a 
continuation of missed opportunities for effective leverage. Why do apprehensions rates 
not indicate a secure border? Do control, surveillance, fencing, and force create security? 
Leaders must begin to ask, “security for whom exactly, and for which moral value 
specifically?” By exploring how differing social, political, cultural, and moral influences 
affect crime rates at borders, leverage points will begin to emerge. The ecosystems of 
trade, radicalization, foreign policy, identities, and technology will be understood to 
create many highly complex adaptive systems, interconnected, and constantly evolving. 
Only then will decision makers begin to understand the folly in ordering costly, 
mechanistic, and counterproductive enforcement policies and strategies.  
As societies across the globe have become increasingly inter-linked and 
inter-dependent, it logically follows that crime would therefore follow-suit 
thus becoming transnational in ways that now concern us. 
Therefore, gaining the understanding that is required must therefore begin 
with understanding how our societies are changing and interacting with 
others…. Trade, monetary flow, urban sprawl irrespective of borders, 
legal and illegal immigration, and cyber connections, among many others, 
are changing at dizzying speeds and in highly complex ways. All of these 
trajectories, all of these changes, and the first, second, third, etc. order 
impacts each change and trajectory has on all the others, create a web of 
changing realities that constitute today's world.  
Within this almost incomprehensible maze of change lies the opportunities 
and vulnerabilities within which an increasingly interconnected array of 
criminal actors ply their trade. ….[F]irst, we must understand, and not just 
the criminal, but also the rapidly changing environment within which he 
operates. To act before we understand is more likely to be folly than 
wisdom. 
–Major General Michael Negata171  
171 Riley and Kiernan, eds., “The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A 
Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Security,” 4–5. 
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As technology and threats rapidly adapt in a changing and budget-constrained 
environment, the homeland security project must also adapt its missions, strategies, and 
performance to seek coherence of a continuously evolving complex ecosystem 
continually, while also balancing between growth, speed, and effectiveness. The social 
nature of the border system creates dynamics that inhibit predictive capabilities, and 
renders traditional performance measures useless. Apprehensions of illegal immigrants 
do not, for example, inform decision makers as to the state of the border. The reasons 
why those immigrants chose to cross, and under what circumstances, would be more 
informative. Similarly, the kilograms or pounds of drugs seized do not inform the state of 
the drug trade. The reasons why Americans continue to have an appetite for narcotics, 
what types, and why they have not received treatment (or re-engaged in drug use after 
treatment) would be lend significant insights into the state of cross-border trafficking. 
The primary objective of this thesis was to demonstrate border security is a CAS, 
and if so, whether this finding would serve to better inform policy makers as to the nature 
and state of the border and security. Illustrating the value of thinking in systems (instead 
of missions or programs) was a second objective of this thesis. Lastly, this thesis intended 
to challenge assumptions of what borders and border security are thought to be, catalyze 
discussions about the interconnections of identity, globalization, push and pull influences, 
and to inspire creativity in thinking about 21st century borders: what they represent and 
the challenges they pose.  
A graphic model was chosen to illustrate the border CAS visually. System 
dynamics was chosen as the archetype for the conceptual model to convince the reader, 
through visual illustration, that border security is not a linear, geographic or static 
process, but rather a CAS with oscillating behavioral attributes that respond and evolve 
(both positively and negatively) to policy implementations and information feedback 
loops. Relationships between actors and elements were explained at the macro-level, and 
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components, relationships, elements, and influences were selected for incorporation if 
they were found to have a geographical, functional, social, strategic, financial, 
technological, or have oversight nexus to the border system.  
B. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS 
A CAS is a group of simple parts, items, and/or people that interact and 
collectively influence the behavior of the larger system, which is irreducible to its parts. 
Just as a CAS cannot be reduced to its parts, the properties of the parts cannot be 
combined to describe the whole. System behavior can be observed holistically, lending 
insight as to the interactions and behaviors between the parts of the system. Borders are 
more than a line separating countries. They serve as areas, regions, corridors, frontiers, 
and political and cultural interfaces. They are also economic hubs, influence foreign 
diplomacy, reflect values (and fears), and can be used to start wars. These dynamics and 
relationships create the complexity that is the border CAS.  
Border security programs draw insight into what are perceived as threats: people, 
activities, and things that may cause unmanageable national effects. The assumption is 
that the effects of these threats would be irreparable to the “American way of life,” and 
thus, requires a protectionist, zero-sum control strategy. Yet, borders are interdependent 
and evolve with globalization, social and cultural migration, and technological growth. 
The border system cannot be secured, nor can threats be predicted. The disconnect 
between threat, protectionism, and the characteristics of the border CAS illustrate an 
example of the gap in knowledge that this thesis is contributing to bridge. Borders are 
cross-matrixed with many divergent people, activities, and things, licit and illicit, and yet, 
the “American way of life” still stands. Given that threats are fear-based, border security 
programs lend insight into the fears and uncertainty of policy makers.  
Border policies, such as the southern border fence and immigration reform, do not 
reflect coherence of system dynamics, are ill suited for the globalized 21st century, and 
create more vulnerabilities, such as decentralization of criminal organizations, increased 
dangers placed upon migrants, and catalyzing criminal organizations to innovate 
smuggling methods (e.g., catapults, semi-submersibles, surgically implanting dogs). 
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Moreover, understanding why the United States chooses to see something as a threat 
requiring both media and executive attention, as well as excessive resources and force, is 
a key factor in understanding the border CAS. Agencies, adversaries, elected officials, 
nongovernmental organizations, and activists alike are part of the CAS, and thus, create 
dynamics through their behaviors. Critically self-assessing social, political, economic, 
cultural, and psychological influences and motivations driving threat perception are just 
as important to making sense of “why it is the way it is,” as studying TCO behaviors.  
Globalization in its current form has blurred the efficacy and coherence of geo-
political borders. The borders, from an institutional perspective, have become an all but 
declared proxy war zone that must be defended at any cost, from value-based threats. 
Yet, as evidenced by trade and economic policies, this defense becomes a hindrance to 
facilitation. The protectionist vision has created a border security industry grounded on 
force, surveillance, suspicion, and restriction. Simultaneously, economic and foreign 
interdependencies bolstering globalization require borders to be fluid, and policies 
associated with them faciliatory. As nations continue to expand economic and resource 
interdependencies in the name of growth, the systems of social welfare, identity, 
employment, criminal enterprises, and corporate interests also become interdependent 
and evolve.  
Through modeling of “transnational terrorist” and “trade” cross-border 
movement, four policy-centric, external pillars that affect border security became evident: 
1) institutional capacity and priorities, 2) criminal capacity and priorities, 3) the ability to 
move people and goods across borders rapidly, and 4) operational capacity and priorities. 
Culture, identity, adversarial adaptation, enforcement, and moral values influence, were 
found to influence and be influenced by, perceptions of what is seen to be a threat. The 
border was found to be a frontier landscape of globalization. It is a merger of “us” and 
“them,” domestic and foreign, rich and poor, secular and religious, individual and 
collective, social and political, moral and amoral. The border and border security serve as 
an intersection of interdependent, interconnected agents that respond, experience, learn, 
and adapt.  
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C. IMPLICATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
By recognizing the interconnectedness of institutional, operational, facilitation, 
and criminal capabilities, both foreign and domestic, leaders and policy makers can at 
once understand that the characteristics of borders have and create global implications. 
Prior to this research, it was not readily understood the degree to which seemingly 
unrelated phenomena, such as perceptions of identity or foreign economic policy 
decisions, create fluctuations in border behaviors. The researcher believed economic 
interdependencies existed, but was surprised to discover the depth and breadth of social 
and cultural influences well beyond border regions. This discovery has the potential of 
completely reframing the function and reach of border security policies.  
Through the study of border security in relation to CAS characteristics, a 
contribution has been made to furthering the fields of border security, national security, 
and foreign policy by providing additional theoretical insights into the study of borders. 
Contributing to the study of borders may provide policy makers the opportunity to apply 
a new method of sensing situational awareness, technique to draw associations between 
policy, perceptions, and behaviors, and a new perspective on what security programs are 
intended to achieve.  
This thesis contributes to bridging a knowledge gap that exists in understanding 
the complexity of border security, dynamics that result in unintended consequences from 
and to foreign and domestic policies, and why measures of border security are so elusive. 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to bridging the knowledge gap in making sense of 
how many divergent fields, such as psychology, defense, control, economy, globalization, 
and jurisdictional authority connect and relate to one another, at and around the border. 
This research can be used to expand the exploration of unconventional leverage points, 
better understand holistic implications of border policies, explore the institutionalization 
of systems thinking, and more broadly, improve sense making for homeland security.  
As the border security complex continues to struggle with bridging “security” 
with “facilitation and growth,” social groups throughout the world, in turn, struggle with 
the effects these issues place upon their safety and identity. The conceptual model of the 
 92 
border CAS is one step towards understanding the consequences of these struggles, and 
towards better informing border security policy decisions. Additional research on the 
topic of globalization and socio-economics is necessary, however, before coherence can 
be reached.  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis highlighted several additional areas in need of research. Models by 
their very nature are incomplete. They serve as snap-shots in time, of a select number of 
variables. That said, more sub-models need to be researched and constructed before the 
conceptual model is complete enough to render a useful border simulation model, to 
include financial systems, drug addiction, transportation systems, weak governments, 
mass migration, territorial occupations, natural resource dependencies and sources, and 
ideological networks. How can a territorial boundary, a geographically defined concept, 
influence and affect global, local, and corporate economies? Is globalization also a living 
CAS as well, or is it a complex adaptive system of systems (CASoS)? Can control and 
protection measures themselves be perceived as threats to “freedom, security, and way of 
life”? What messages does the border send to the globalized system, and vice versa?  
If future research is conducted on the effects of globalization and socio-
economics on identities and perceived fear, it may help determine whether the bordering 
phenomena described by Saskia Sassen affects the border CAS in any meaningful way, 
and if so, how and why. It may also assist in uncovering contributing root causes of 
radicalization. This research would likely provide insights into the driving factors behind 
transnationalism, and may aid in moving one step closer to identifying unconventional 
leverage points that could address the root causes of illegal and illicit cross-border 
behaviors.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrated that border security is a CAS. It demonstrated that the 
border is a living system, interconnected, interdependent, learning and evolving along 
with other global systems. The border CAS influences and is affected by social and 
cultural identities, and technological advancements, which is important because the 
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behavior of a CAS cannot be predicted, nor can it be controlled. This research is intended 
to provide a foundation from which coherence of borders and border security can be 
built; the conceptual model will not in itself achieve this end. The research focuses on 
historical context, perceptions, identity, and subjective threat. It does not describe all 
issues that affect border security, nor does it attempt to examine the logistical, legislative, 
jurisdictional, or legal constraints associated with border policies. Moreover, the 
conceptual model developed from this research is one-dimension and does not visually 
present the multi-layered, multi-dimensional ecosystem that borders and border security 
create. Finally, this thesis does not provide a prescriptive solution to border security, 
quantitative evidence, or regional variances of border dynamics.  
Leaders must begin to ask, “security for whom exactly, and for which moral value 
specifically?”  
By exploring how differing social, political, cultural, and moral influences affect 
crime rates at borders, leverage points will begin to emerge. Insights will be elucidated as 
to how policies affect disparate sub-systems, systems, and systems-of-systems. The 
ecosystems of trade, radicalization, foreign policy, identities, and technology will be 
understood to create many highly complex adaptive systems, interconnected and 
constantly evolving. This thesis was one small step towards that end.  
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VII. POST-CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD  
This chapter is intended to provide the reader with usable recommendations to 
further develop, validate, and test the conceptual CAS model. The chapter concludes with 
suggested steps towards the institutionalization of systems thinking, government wide, 
which will enable wider application of the analytic and modeling techniques 
demonstrated throughout this thesis to other homeland security topics.  
A. MODELING THE BORDER AS A LIVING SYSTEM 
Conceptual (qualitative) modeling of the system, the agents, and their behavioral 
influences (values, perceptions, identities), will better inform the public and agency 
administrators of landscape complexity. Informational and learning feedback loops must 
accompany this model, as should stock and flow data (i.e., rates and levels). Once 
memorialized, computational simulation models (quantitative) can then be developed to 
test and further refine the concept.  
Framing the “big picture” of agents, inter-dependencies, and associated dynamics 
of the complexity that is the border, will bring coherence to decision making and strategy.  
Computational modeling and simulations are essential to provide empirical and 
statistically defensible probabilities. Demonstrating and testing the interdependencies and 
influences of social, cultural, geographic, functional, jurisdictional, value, and identity 
elements will turn the border security enterprise on its head, as not just geo-political 
border lines, fences, or technology, but systemic relationships. Sanctions creating 
institutional inadequacy, in turn, weakened governments; in turn, population needs not 
being met; in turn, population vulnerabilities leading to criminal influence, and in turn, 
resulting in increased violence, for example. The very concept of security, threat, and 
borders will need to be reassessed.  
For this disruption to occur, a conceptual model must be computed, tested, re-
tested, and validated. This testing and validation process will require contributions of a 
wide array of disciplinary skillsets, distillation of massive datasets, and the will of both 
public and private institutions to collaborate. A concerted effort will need to be made to 
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keep biases to a minimum, including assumptions regarding adversarial behaviors. This 
process and collaboration is possible, with independent sponsorship. Political, corporate, 
and lobby interests will prove a challenge. 
1. Stakeholders 
Stakeholders with vested interests in border security include government, private, 
public, and tribal organizations; anyone who has any jurisdiction, administrative 
responsibility, ownership, citizenship, profit, access, or sovereignty associated with 
borders. Municipal, state, and federal authorities, foreign governments, transnational and 
cartel networked organizations; private industry, civilians and military alike have a place 
in the modeling. Domestic entities entrusted with responsibilities within border 
environments range from local police departments and county sheriffs, public health 
officials, fire and emergency medical response organizations, private industries, elected 
officials and their supporting offices (at municipal, county, state, and federal levels), the 
Department of Defense, and disparate federal law enforcement and administrative 
agencies.  
Those with interest in the output of modeling and simulation of the border system 
will be vast. Individual and organizational interests would likely be impacted by the 
findings, to include budgetary shifts, changes in contracts, staffing and infrastructure 
realignments, and impacts of voter base support of elected officials. Policies, laws, 
foreign agreements, and expenditures could be amended or rescinded, as insights are 
drawn regarding the leverage points within and around the border system. Stakeholders 
could conceivably span the globe.  
2. Transformative Value 
Observing characteristics of borders as an intersection of global landscapes, 
fraught with complexities well beyond predictability, calls into question the capacity of 
prevention. If system behaviors emerge unpredictably, threats to that system will be those 
things (or people) that could push the system from complexity to chaos. This concept, 
that prediction is untenable and control unachievable, could transform border security 
away from programs. What it would be transformed to is still an unknown, but programs, 
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such as fences, single-issue technology, and organizations with overlapping missions 
(e.g., TSA, CBP, USCG, ICE, USCIS), would have to be dismantled, merged, or reduced. 
Missions, such as immigration enforcement, customs enforcement, and drug enforcement 
are programs, focused on prediction and control. As mentioned numerous times 
throughout this thesis, behaviors, such as immigration, trade, crime terrorism, and 
enforcement, are created and reinforced by system dynamics. What environmental factors 
(natural, political, social, structural, economic, moral) influence these behaviors to occur? 
What creates the increases and decreases in these behaviors? What social, economic, 
cultural, religious, and political factors are affecting these behaviors? How do these 
behaviors change over time and space? These questions reflect systems thinking. The 
responses to these questions establish patterns. Understanding these patterns is sense 
making.  
Demonstrating the complexity of the border security system through simulation 
will elucidate weaknesses of current policies and funding initiatives. Conceptual models 
are theoretical and abstract. They are a necessary first step; however, they are not useful 
unless converted into computation models that can run simulations to test the theory. 
Simulation models are mathematical and interactive and react to changes in variables 
entered by the user. These reactions will validate whether the rules of a model are 
accurate (when compared to historical cases), and provide a mechanism by which many 
different policy options can be tested to assess the probability of intended and unintended 
consequences should those policies be implemented.  
Awareness of complexity and the inadequacy of current tools of management will 
necessarily lead into questioning “if not this, then what?” Systems thinking 
(interconnections, influences, controls, dynamics, and patterns; not parts and individuals) 
is one of many new tools required to navigate the complexities of the globalized 21st 
century. Awareness will expose the fear of stakeholders and alight vulnerabilities within 
current capabilities. This fear and absence of clarity and capacity will pose significant 
challenges in both the testing and validation process of systems analysis, should these 
efforts be perceived as challenging preferred policies and programs (power, identity, and 
profit).  
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This testing and validation process will require contribution of a wide array of 
disciplinary skillsets, distillation of massive datasets, and the will of both public and 
private institutions to collaborate. Complex systems with global interdependencies, such 
as border security, cannot be understood or tested in a vacuum. Financial (international 
transfers, wires, and bitcoin), transportation (interstate and international), agriculture 
(local, corporate, and multinational), immigration (all facets), radicalization, and free 
trade agreements are among just a few systems that intersect and influence border 
dynamics. Data analysts, engineers, sociologists, psychologists, and many other private 
and public professionals are necessary to ensure accuracy of information, and balanced 
research. A concerted effort will need to be made to keep biases to a minimum, including 
assumptions regarding adversarial behaviors. This process and collaboration is possible, 
with independent sponsorship. Political, corporate, and lobby interests will prove a 
challenge. 
3. Cost, Schedule, and Time 
Budget figures to verify, test, and simulate the conceptual model of border 
security are unknown. Further, the process of institutionalizing system dynamics thinking 
skillsets throughout government will be an iterative process spanning years, jurisdictions, 
departments, and public and private sectors. Program costs to conduct verification, 
testing, and simulation functions will be incurred, to include staffing, grant, training, 
travel, and facilities costs. The figures for these costs are not readily identifiable at this 
early stage. Beyond implementation, overlaid costs of decommissioning programs, 
projects, and infrastructure found irrelevant from the findings of the system dynamics 
analysis will also be incurred. 
Aside from direct financial costs, indirect costs may also be incurred, such as 
communications, reporting, networking, information sharing constraints, access to 
adversarial data, participant turnover, retention incentives, multi-national buy-in, and data 
warehousing issues.  
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The conceptual model will follow three distinct phases: development, testing, and 
simulation. These phases will be iterative and parallel, ending only when a verified and 
validated model is completed. From that point, the model will need to be periodically re-
tested and re-calibrated as local and global dynamics change. The initial process could 
conceivably span a one-year schedule. This schedule estimate would be highly dependent 
upon the timely mitigation of risks and constraints. 
Institutionalizing system dynamics skillsets throughout government will follow a 
much longer schedule. This process will also follow an iterative process, by agency, 
department, locale, prioritization of job classifications, and availability of training and 
travel budgets. It is conceivable that initial training could be achieved holistically within 
five years. Refresher and periodic monitoring of skillset application will overlay the 
primary training schedule, and continue on well beyond the five-year initiative.  
 
Steps to make progress towards comprehensive modeling of the border CAS 
 
1. Initial conceptual model 
2. Conversion of model into initial computational model 
3. Test model with single issue; note gaps and strengths 
4. Test model with multiple issues; note gaps and strengths 
5. Test model with competitive issues; note gaps and strengths 
6. Expand upon sub-models with subjects found relevant to bridge gaps  
7. Re-calibrate conceptual and computation model 
8. Repeat steps 3–7 until results render confidence in model integrity 
9. Memorialize rules and data points 
10. Continually test with current events, adapting rules as the CAS evolves 
 
Steps to make progress towards the institutionalization of system thinking skillsets 
 
1. Identify stakeholders and prospective students 
2. Map budgetary, procedural, fiscal, and jurisdictional constraints that could 
infringe on education 
3. Identify execution platform (e.g., classroom, virtual, scenario, gaming, 
hybrid, etc.) 
4. Develop educational program (direct and indirect requirements) 
5. Source curriculum developers and instructors 
6. Develop curriculum 
7. Structure curriculum platforms 
8. Select pilot group of students and test curriculum 
9. Re-calibrate curriculum and platform per feedback 
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10. Initiate whole-of-government interactive curriculum, and management 
transition 
11. Develop refresher and advanced curriculum and execution platform(s) 
12. Monitor performance of students, before and after education 
13. Monitor governance performance, as systems thinking tools are applied to 
policy 
4. Probable Opposition and Conflicting Agendas 
Policies, laws, foreign agreements, and expenditures could be amended or 
rescinded, as insights are drawn regarding the leverage points within and around the 
border system. Opposition would likely come from two directions, political and financial. 
System dynamics and complexity thinking instill insights that many, if not most, threats 
are interconnected and influenced by many disparate and counterintuitive sources. 
Patterns of behavior and leverage points, not programs, will be the new security paradigm 
and will likely result in program officials and staff perceiving loss of power, budget, 
control, and purpose. Moreover, campaign agendas will be contradicted and challenged. 
Politicians often campaign on single issues. If single issues are found to be effects, not 
sources, of social problems, voter base polls may be impacted contrary to the desired 
direction of politicians, lobbyists, interest groups, and industrial complexes. Appointed 
administrators and senior leaders, who are beholden to the whims of elected officials, 
may also represent conflicting agendas. Unions will also present a conflict, in an effort to 
protect members who are employed based upon the interpretation of a need for a single-
issue capacity, such as border patrol, and customs. Another conflict will likely arise from 
private industry that makes millions in profit from government contracts focused upon 
traditional, linear security programs.  
B. DIGGING DEEPER, THINKING BROADER, CHALLENGING THE 
STATUS QUO 
Specific topics need to be explored, data collected, and tested via simulation to 
establish empirical models of broader and deeper border security dynamics. These 
simulations would contribute to analysis of existing policies, produce statistical cost-
benefit analysis, and test alternative leverage points. Some of these topics include the 
following.  
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• U.S. military support in Central and South America, genocide and TCO 
expansion  
• Non-intrusive inspection equipment, physical inspection and human 
trafficking  
• Southwest border fence, illegal migrants and TCO violence  
• Tethered aerial surveillance blimps, defense corporations and border 
violence 
• Automated manifest programs, small business impact and local economies 
• Commercial agriculture, NAFTA, Mexican farmers and illegal migration 
Testing issues within a border CAS simulation can feasibly extend infinitely. The 
first, most important future research needed as of this thesis, is to incorporate the 
employment, globalization, and economic links noted in previous chapters, and verify 
and validate the conceptual model. Once a foundational simulation is available, policies 
can be tested and statistically analyzed, and additional rules added to the model as 
research continues.  
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Table 2. Comparative Summaries of Holland, Gell-Mann, Arthur, and Levin.172
172 Data sourced and adapted from Brownlee, Complex Adaptive Systems, 1–3. 
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APPENDIX B.  
 
Figure 8.  Institutional Capacity and Priorities Pillar 
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Figure 9.  TCO Capacity and Priorities Pillar 
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Figure 10.  Operational Capacity and Priorities Pillar 
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Figure 11.  Ability to Move Goods and People Rapidly Pillar 
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